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JANUS CAPITAL GROUP, INC. V. FIRST DERIVA TIVE TRADERS:
THE CULMINATION OF THE SUPREME COURT'S EVOLUTION




"Political" decisions such as Citizens United and National Federa-
tion of Independent Business (Obamacare) reflect the reactionary bent of
several Supreme Court Justices. But this reactionary trend is discernible
in other areas as well. With regard to Rule lOb-5, the Court has handed
down a series of decisions that could be grouped into four trilogies. The
Article examines the trend over the past forty years which has become
increasingly conservative and, finally, reactionary.
The first trilogy was a liberal one, arguably overextending the scope
of Rule lOb-5. This was followed by a conservative trilogy that put a
brake on such extension, but did so in a jurisprudentially sound manner.
The next trilogy, dealing with insider trading, regressed Rule lOb-5 anal-
ysis back to a common law perspective. This was ironic since the securi-
ties laws were enacted because of the inadequacy of the common law.
The final trilogy is unquestionably reactionary. Precedent is disre-
garded and the Court, in constraining the scope of Rule lOb-5, fails to
hold accountable clearly wrongful conduct such as conspiring to inflate a
corporation's earnings or making false representations in prospectuses.
In so doing, the Court characterizes a conspiracy to inflate the earnings
of a corporation as an "ordinary course transaction" taking place in the
"marketplace for goods and services" and adopts a definition of "mak-
ing" a statement hat exculpates the person who drafted the statement and
was the only person who knew the statement was false.
Consequently, the conclusion asserts that the Court is less interested
in protecting investors and more interested in constraining the scope of
Rule lOb-5, and asserts the need for Congress to reinstate aiding and
abetting liability in private securities fraud litigation. Such action by
Congress will reverse not just Central Bank but also Stoneridge and Ja-
t Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago. I would like to express my appreciation for
their helpful comments to Patricia O'Hara, Professor of Law at Notre Dame, and David Ruder,
Professor of Law at Northwestern University and Former Chairman, Securities and Exchange Com-
mission. Professor Ruder pointed out that, with class actions, an expansive approach to Rule 10 b-5
could potentially impose ruinous liability on an issuer. I concur. But Central Bank and its progeny
can create a "what, me worry" attitude. The best way to avoid liability is to tell the truth. Unfortu-
nately, in business, as in politics, truthfulness is sometimes a forgotten virtue.
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nus Capital, which supposedly were mandated by the Supreme Court's
decision in Central Bank.
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INTRODUCTION
It is surprising that the United States Supreme Court would occupy
center stage in the midst of a presidential campaign. Yet, as the end of its
2012 term approached, the anticipated decision in National Federation of
Independent Business v. Sebelius' preoccupied the media.2 To the sur-
prise of many, Chief Justice Roberts switched from the "conservative"
block to join the four "liberals" in upholding the Affordable Care Act.3
Although the mandate in the Act requiring those who could afford insur-
ance to do so or pay a penalty was upheld as a tax, Justice Roberts de-
termined that he federal government could not support the mandate un-
der the Commerce Clause,4 nor could the federal government require the
states to expand Medicare coverage or else lose their existing Medicare
funding.5 Thus, his decision hardly reflected a conversion to the liberal
wing of the Court.
At the same time, Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission
6
again became topical as millions of dollars of political advertisements
flooded the media.7 Citizens United curtailed the power of the federal
government to limit political donations8 and, in the current term, the
Court also limited the power of the states to do so.9 While the Roberts
1. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
2. See Linda P. Campbell, Editorial, Decision Day for Health Care Law, PITTSBURGH POST-
GAZETTE, June 22, 2012, at A7 (discussing the media's repeated attempts to gain access for TV
cameras to record the Court's opinion announcements); Ann Gerhart, Nothing to Do but Wait for
Court Decision, WASH. POST, June 25, 2012, at Cl (discussing the strong interest in the court's
ruling in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, including mem-
bers of the media); Michael Grillo & Kristin Stoller, 13K Tweets a Minute After Law Upheld Health
Care Ruling, HARTFORD COURANT, June 29, 2012, at A4 (noting that all news organizations were
anxiously waiting the Court's decision, leading to several releasing incorrect information before they
understood the actual result).
3. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2601 ("[The mandate] is therefore constitutional, because it can
reasonably be read as a tax."); see also Richard A. Epstein, Op-Ed., A Confused Opinion, N.Y.
TIMES, June 29, 2012, at A25 (noting "[tihe stunner yesterday was that Chief Justice John G. Roberts
Jr., [was] joined by the Supreme Court's four most liberal justices .... ); Martine Powers, Morning
of Tension Is Broken by Cheers, BOS. GLOBE, June 29, 2012, at A, available at
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2012/06/29/harvard law professors students cheer su
preme court decision on health care act/ (discussing the surprise felt by all when learning that
Justice Roberts upheld the Affordable Care Act).
4. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2591.
5. Id. at 2607.
6. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
7. See Mat Bai, How Did Political Money Get This Loud?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 22,
2012, at MM14 (discussing the impact of Citizens United on political fundraising); Richard L.
Hasen, The Numbers Don't Lie, SLATE (Mar. 12, 2012),
http://www.slate.com/artices/news-andpolitics/politics/201 2/03/the supreme-court-s-citizens uni
ted decision has led to an explosion of campaign spending .html (noting that in the 2012
election season through March 8, total spending was 234 percent higher than 2008's numbers and
628 percent higher than 2004's numbers).
8. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365-66.
9. See Am. Tradition P'ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490, 2491 (2012) (per curiam)
(stating that the holding from Citizens United clearly applies to state law).
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Court is often referred to as conservative, arguably it might be more ac-
curately described as reactionary or libertarian. "Libertarian" is the term
George Will, a conservative pundit, has applied to Justice Kennedy, the
so-called swing vote.'
0
These decisions, though highly significant, arguably involved "po-
litical" issues, rather than moral and ethical issues, that is, those that in-
volve whether or not certain conduct is wrongful. However, the reaction-
ary shift of the court is visible in these areas as well.
Consider Securities and Exchange Commission Rule lOb-5, which
embraces the ethic of the securities laws that it is "sinful" not just to lie,
but to tell half-truths as well." The private cause of action under Rule
lOb-5 was judicially adopted in the 1946 case of Kardon v. National
Gypsum Co.12 Over twenty years passed before the Supreme Court
opined upon Rule 1Ob-5 and, during that period, lower courts *took an
expansive view of its scope to remedy a broad range of wrongdoing. The
initial approach of the Supreme Court to Rule lOb-5 was a "liberal" one,
but over time the approach became more conservative.
A little over a year ago, the Supreme Court, in Janus Capital
Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders,3 decided the third case in a tril-
ogy of decisions that are unique both in their dubious jurisprudence and
the willingness of the Court to adopt an interpretation of the law that
permitted clearly wrongful conduct to go unpunished. Accountability for
wrongful conduct is no longer a serious jurisprudential consideration for
the Roberts Court. Since the Supreme Court ventured into the Rule 1 Ob-5
domain in 1969, it has handed down several decisions that can be
grouped into a series of trilogies.
The first trilogy was a liberal one that expanded the scope of Rule
1Ob-5, while the second trilogy was a conservative one that put the
brakes on such expansion.15 This latter trilogy embodied sound policy
and thoughtful jurisprudence, although Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores16 did not reflect judicial restraint-at this point a bellwether of
conservative judicial philosophy. But then came two trilogies, supposed-
ly conservative, that were characterized by sloppy reasoning and an out-
10. See Lucas Grindley, George Will Predicts Win for Marriage Equality in Supreme Court,
ADVOCATE.COM (July 2, 2012, 12:48 AM ET), http://www.advocate.com/politics/marriage-
equality/2012/07/02/george-will-predicts-win-marriage-equality-supreme-court (quoting George
Will as saying, "I think [Justice Kennedy is] ... driven in both directions by a constant compass and
that is he's a libertarian" (internal quotation mark omitted)).
11. See SEC Rule l0b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2013) (making it a violation to "make any
untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading").
12. 69 F. Supp. 512, 513-14 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
13. 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011).
14. See infra Part I.A.
15. See infra Part L.B.
16. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
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come-determinative approach to judicial decision making. The third tril-
ogy dealt with insider trading 7 and the fourth, and current, trilogy with
the potential liability of those who might be characterized as "collateral
participants" in fraud.18 Sadly, these latter two trilogies had the effect of
insulating corporate corruption from liability and undermining the inves-
tor protection that was the goal of the securities acts.
The first decision in the fourth trilogy, Central Bank of Denver,
N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 19 eliminated secondary
20liability for aiding and abetting under the securities laws. Congress
responded by reinstating aiding and abetting liability in enforcement
actions brought by the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC).2 1 The
second decision, Stoneridge Investment Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta,
22Inc., though it arguably involved primary liability, rejected a cause of
action against those who conspired with their customer to inflate the cus-
tomer's earnings.23 Supposedly the Supreme Court was constrained by
the Central Bank decision. The third and current decision, Janus Capital,
insulated an asset management firm and its investment advisor subsidiary
from liability for misrepresentations made by a mutual fund it spon-
sored.24 The Court's ill-reasoned analysis as to who "makes" a misrepre-
sentation has far-reaching implications, and the logic of its decision
could insulate corporate management, other than directors, from liability
for fraudulent representations the corporation makes affecting securities
markets.
Part I of this Article traces the evolution of Rule lob-5 from its
origin and development in the lower courts until the Supreme Court's
initial venture into the Rule lOb-5 thicket, in which the court facilitated
the expansion of Rule lOb-5 litigation, arguably beyond reasonable
boundaries. Part II then reviews the second trilogy in which the Court,
moving in a conservative direction after appointments by President Nix-
on, placed a series of constraints upon the ability to bring a Rule lOb-5
action, employing a well-reasoned perspective that took into account the
other provisions of the securities laws. Part III analyzes the third trilogy
which, rather than putting a brake upon unwarranted expansion of Rule
lOb-5, involved undercutting the essential purposes of the securities laws
to provide a fair playing field for investors-and regressed the analysis
of securities litigation to a common-law perspective, even though the
securities laws were enacted because the common law was inadequate to
17. See infra Part Ill.
18. See infra Part IV.
19. 511 U.S. 164(1994).
20. Id. at 184-85.
21. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
(109 Stat.) 737.
22. 552 U.S. 148 (2008).
23. Id. at 159.
24. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2302 (2011).
[Vol. 91:2
2014] JANUS CAPITAL GROUP AND RULE JOB-5 ACTIONS 375
deal with securities fraud. Part IV of the Article then focuses upon the
liability of what are arguably collateral participants, that is, persons who
are not the primary wrongdoer but rather assist or conspire with the pri-
mary wrongdoer. This is a critical area since the primary wrongdoer, by
the time the fraud is uncovered, is often insolvent or otherwise unable to
make whole the investors injured by the fraud. In addition, collateral
participants are often "gatekeepers" upon whom the public relies to en-
sure that issuers are responsible and accountable.
The tragedy of the decisions comprising the fourth trilogy is that,
even though the existence of wrongdoing is unquestioned, the Supreme
Court opted to let the wrongdoers go unpunished and extended similar
protection to subsequent generations of wrongdoers. Part IV first exam-
ines the unparalleled judicial activism reflected in the Central Bank deci-
sion. It then examines how the Court twisted well-settled principles of
law in an outcome-determinative mode of judicial decision making. Cen-
tral Bank appeared to leave the door ajar when, arguably, those assisting
the primary wrongdoer were so directly involved in the fraud that they
could be considered primary wrongdoers themselves. But, in Stoneridge
Investment Partners, an unnecessary extension of Central Bank, the
Court again twisted logic in holding that a conspiracy with suppliers to
inflate earnings did not impact investors.
Finally, Part IV analyzes the impact of Janus Capital. Superficially,
the decision involves a limited issue: the responsibility of an asset man-
ager for misrepresentations made by its captive mutual fund. However,
by markedly narrowing the concept of who "makes" a misrepresentation,
the decision could have far-reaching, untoward consequences. For exam-
ple, the district court in the Enron litigation found that the attorneys for
Enron, who knowingly drafted false disclosure documents, could be lia-
ble for "making" a misrepresentation. This analysis would now be fore-
closed by the Janus Capital decision.
The Conclusion asserts that the Supreme Court was fully aware of
the wrongdoing involved in Stoneridge Investment Partners and Janus
Capital, and the impact of its decisions. Thus, the conclusion is inescap-
able that the Supreme Court is more concerned with constraining the
scope of the securities laws than curtailing corporate fraud. The result is
diminished protection for the investing public. It is also clear that the
Court is not acting as an umpire,25 dispassionately applying well-settled
law in the cases that come before it, but rather unsettling established law
25. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice
of the United States, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) (statement of John G. Roberts, Chief Justice nominee),
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/09/13/AR2005091300693.html ("Judges and Justices are servants of the
law, not the other way around. Judges are like umpires. Umpires don't make the rules, they apply
them.").
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in a reactionary fashion to undermine the basic principles undergirding
the securities laws.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE EVOLUTION OF RULE 1013-5
A. The Growth of a Little Acorn into a Massive Oak Tree
Rule lOb-5 was promulgated in 194226 pursuant to Section 10 of the
1934 Securities Exchange Act.27 By its terms, it defines certain manipu-
lative or deceptive conduct as illegal and, thus, could be the basis for a
SEC enforcement action28 or criminal prosecution by U.S. Attorneys.29 It
was not until 1946, in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.,30 that a federal
court implied a private course of action based upon Rule lob-5. What is
striking about the opinion is its brevity and curt analysis. Based upon the
analogy to a statutory tort, the Kardon court accepted as basically self-
evident the judicial principle that a rule defining illegality could establish
a duty, the breach of which could give rise to a civil cause of action.
31
After the Kardon decision, litigation premised upon Rule lOb-5 fig-
uratively exploded. While courts frequently struggled to find deception,
32
many of these cases involved conduct that could be characterized as a
breach of fiduciary duty.33 Thus, some commentators questioned whether
a federal law of corporations was developing.34
The apogee of the development of Rule lob-5 occurred in 1968 in
the Texas Gulf Sulphur litigation. In an enforcement action, SEC v. Tex-
26. Securities and Exchange Commission, 13 Fed. Reg. 8177 (Dec. 22, 1948) (codified at 17
C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5(b) (2013)).
27. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012).
28. See id.
29. See id
30. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
31. Id. at 513-14.
32. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 463 (1977) (holding that deception
is required for a violation of Rule 10b-5); Kademian v. Ladish Co., 792 F.2d 614, 622 (7th Cir.
1986) (dismissing, after extensive analysis of whether defendants deceived the plaintiffs, the I Ob-5
claims for lack of manipulation or deception); Madison Consultants v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 710
F.2d 57, 61-62 (2d Cir. 1983) (providing that alleged wrongful removal of a restrictive legend on a
stock issuance was not a cause of action under Rule lOb-5 because plaintiffs alleged no manipulation
or deception).
33. See, e.g., Rosenfeld v. Black, 445 F.2d 1337 (2d Cir. 1971), (holding that an investment
advisor corporation that realized profits in connection with the appointment of a new advisor upon
its recommendation violated its fiduciary duty, thereby violating the Investment Company Act),
superseded by statute, Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(f) (1975), as recog-
nized in Meyer v. Oppenheimer Mgmt. Corp., 895 F.2d 861, 865 (2d Cir. 1990); Schein v. Chasen,
478 F.2d 817, 823 (2d Cir. 1973) (stating that while a breach of fiduciary duty usually leads to
recourse through state laws, such a breach can also lead to a federal cause of action under Rule 1 Ob-
5), vacated, Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386 (1974); Slavin v. Germantown Fire Ins. Co., 174
F.2d 799, 814 (3d Cir. 1949) (stating that the court need not find a breach of a fiduciary duty to find
liability under federal securities laws, but such a breach can be sufficient in showing a violation).
34. See, e.g., Arthur Fleischer, Jr., "Federal Corporation Law": An Assessment, 78 HARV. L.
REV. 1146, 1146-47 (1965); Stanley A. Kaplan, Corporation Law and Securities Regulation, 18
Bus. LAW. 868, 868 (1963); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Federal Corporate Law: Les-
sons from History, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1793, 1794 (2006).
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as Gulf Sulphur Co.,35 the Second Circuit examined the conduct sur-
rounding the discovery by Texas Gulf Sulphur of a rich ore deposit in
Timmins, Canada.36 "Act I" encompassed the period from the drilling of
a core in November 1963 until April 1964.37 During this period, corpo-
rate employees and directors purchased Texas Gulf Sulphur stock on the
open market.38 "Act II" began in early April 1964, when rumors that the
ore strike was extraordinary began circulating; in response, the company
issued what has been characterized either as a "gloomy" or a "mislead-
ing" press release on April 12, 1964 and four days later, announced the
extraordinary nature of the find.39
With regard to Act I, the Second Circuit determined that employees,
even low-level employees, who purchased stock, were "insider[s]" who
could not trade on "inside information," namely material non-public in-
formation,40 but rather had a duty to "disclose ... or ... abstain.",4 1 In
Act II, in determining that the company was liable for the misleading
press release, the court essentially employed a negligence standard.42
And, in defining materiality, the court vacillated between information
that a reasonable investor might4 3 consider important versus would"t con-
sider important. While the case was an enforcement action, it spawned a
series of private damages actions.45
Texas Gulf Sulphur was foreshadowed by an SEC decision authored
by former Columbia Law Professor William Cary, and then-SEC Chair-
man, In re Cady, Roberts & Co. 4 6 That case was a "bad news" situation:
Curtiss-Wright's Board of Directors had decided to cut the dividend. In
such a situation, someone with foreknowledge might seek to sell Curtiss-
Wright stock. A board member, thinking that the corporate secretary had
earlier disseminated the information to the public,47 telephoned a fellow
partner at Cady Roberts who then sold the stock.
35. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
36. Id. at 839-40.
37. Id. at 843-45.
38. Id. at 844.
39. Id. at 845-47 (internal quotation marks omitted).
40. Id. at 848 (internal quotation marks omitted).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 862-63. This position was reversed in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185
(1976), discussed infra Part l.B.
43. Tex. Gulf, 401 F.2d at 860.
44. Id. at 863. The Supreme Court in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438,
449 (1976), adopted the would/probability standard.
45. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 241 (2d
Cir. 1974) (holding insiders liable directly to plaintiffs that purchased stock on the open market
without knowledge of the material inside information); Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp.,
332 F. Supp. 544, 562 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (allowing civil liability in a class action based on material
misstatements and omissions contained in a registration statement).
46. Cady, Roberts & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 6668, 1961 WL 60638 (Nov. 8, 1961).
See discussion infra note 201.
47. Cady, Roberts & Co., 1961 WL 60638, at *2.
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The Commission disciplined the partner who sold and its opinion is
significant in several respects. First, the partner back at the office who
sold stock (the "tippee") had no connection to Curtiss-Wright.48 Second,
the "tipper," the director, did not know that dissemination of the infor-
mation had been delayed and thus did not "sin," a fact that the Supreme
Court, in the Dirks v. SEC4 9 case, did not appreciate.50 Most importantly,
because this was a bad news situation, the insider would be selling to a
buyer who very likely was not a shareholder.5' Contrast this with a "good
news" situation in which the insider would seek to buy stock: the only
person from whom the insider could buy stock would be a shareholder to
whom a corporate insider arguably would owe a fiduciary duty.5  The
defendant argued that no duty was owed to a non-shareholder to whom
the stock was sold, but the Commission made short shrift of this argu-
ment by asserting that the securities laws were enacted because the
common law was inadequate to protect investors.53 Thus, the absence of
a common law duty was irrelevant to whether there was a violation of the
securities laws-a proposition that the Supreme Court, in Chiarella v.
United States,
54 declined to follow.
55
B. The First Trilogy.- The Supreme Court's Belated Role in Expanding
the Scope of Rule lOb-5
1. National Securities: The Supreme Court's Initial Foray into Rule
IOb-5
Over twenty years passed between the judicial recognition of a pri-
vate cause of action under Rule 1Ob-5 in Kardon and the Supreme
Court's initial consideration of this cause of action in SEC v. National
Securities, Inc.56 As the Court noted, "[a]lthough § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5
may well be the most litigated provisions in the federal securities laws,
this is the first time this Court has found it necessary to interpret them. 57
The National Securities Court then asserted a caution that the Court, as
48. Id.
49. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
50. See id. at 665-67 (holding that the "tippee" only sins if the "tipper" sinned, meaning the
defendant who received inside information from an insider who did not personally benefit from the
disclosure was not liable under Rule 1Ob-5).
51. In "bad news" cases, the insider knows about some impending harm to the company,
meaning the stock price will fall in the future. Here, the insider sells stock, and the buyer of that
stock generally did not already own stock in that company. While a current stockholder can always
buy more stock, it will often be someone without any current ownership of the company.
52. See Goodwin v. Agassiz, 186 N.E. 659, 661 (Mass. 1933) (holding, in a "good news"
case, that directors had no duty to disclose their identity, or the good news, when buying shares from
a current stockholder).
53. Cady, Roberts & Co., 1961 WL 60638, at *5.
54. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
55. See id. at 236 (holding that the defendant, who was not a corporate insider, could not be
liable for trading on material, nonpublic information because the "outsider" owed no duty to the
shareholders, meaning no duty was owed to the plaintiffs).
56. 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
57. Id. at 465.
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constituted subsequent o 1980, should have heeded: "The questions pre-
sented are narrow ones. They arise in an area where glib generalizations
and unthinking abstractions are major occupational hazards.,
58
The primary issue in the National Securities case was whether the
approval of a merger by the Arizona Director of Insurance precluded an
action by the SEC to set aside the merger on the ground that its approval
had been procured by a misleading proxy statement.59 The defendants
argued that such action by the SEC would supersede state law regulating
the business of insurance in violation of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
6
0
The Court concluded that "[t]he paramount federal interest in protecting
shareholders is in this situation perfectly compatible with the paramount
state interest in protecting policy holders.'
The Ninth Circuit had affirmed judgment on the pleadings in favor
of defendants on the basis that McCarran-Ferguson Act barred the SEC
62action. However, defendants had also argued below that a merger did
not constitute a "purchase or sale" under Rule 1Ob-5, and that Rule lOb-5
would not apply to misrepresentations in connection with a proxy notifi-
cation.63 While these issues were not directly before the Court, it
"reached" to provide guidance to the trial court on remand.
The Court made short shrift of both arguments. With respect to the
purchase or sale issue, the Court rejected the "no sale" argument prem-
ised upon the former Rule 13364 and determined that a merger did consti-
tute a sale for purpose of Rule 1Ob-5. The Court stated:
Whatever the terms "purchase" and "sale" may mean in other con-
texts, here an alleged deception has affected individual shareholders'
decisions in a way not at all unlike that involved in a typical cash sale
58. Id.
59. Id. at 455-56.
60. Id. at 456; see 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2012) (stating that "[n]o Act of Congress shall be
construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulat-
ing the business of insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act
specifically relates to the business of insurance .... ").
61. Nat ' Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. at 463. The Court also stated:
The gravamen of the complaint was the misrepresentation, not the merger. The merger
became relevant only insofar as it was necessary to attack it in order to undo the harm
caused by the alleged deception. Presumably, full disclosure would have avoided the par-
ticular Rule I Ob-5 violations alleged in the complaint. Nevertheless, respondents contend
that any attempt to interfere with a merger approved by state insurance officials would
"invalidate, impair, or supersede" the state insurance laws made paramount by the
McCarran-Ferguson Act. We cannot accept this overly broad restriction on federal pow-
er.
Id. at 462-63.
62. Id. at 456.
63. Id. at 464-65 (internal quotation marks omitted).
64. Former Rule 133 provided that certain transactions, such as mergers, did not involve a
"sale" under the 1933 Act, and thus the stock issued in the transaction did not need to be registered
with the SEC prior to sale. Registration of Certain Transactions Involving Merges, Consolidations
and Acquisitions of Assets, 37 Fed. Reg. 23631 (Nov. 7, 1972) (rescinding 17 C.F.R. § 230.133
(1968)).
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or share exchange. The broad antifraud purposes of the statute and
the rule would clearly be furthered by their application to this type of
situation. Therefore we conclude that Producers' shareholders "pur-
chased" shares in the new company by exchanging them for their old
stock.
65
The Court also determined to dismiss rather quickly the argument
that Rule lOb-5 did not cover misrepresentations in proxy material.6 6
Even though an insurance company might be exempt from federal proxy
regulation, "Congress may well have concluded that the Commission's
general antifraud powers over purchases and sales of securities should
continue to apply to insurance securities.67 The approach of the Court
suggests a presumption in favor of expanding the coverage of Rule lob-5
to prevent fraud, rather than restricting the scope of Rule lOb-5 to facili-
tate fraud.
At this stage, the Supreme Court was not only comfortable with the
development of Rule lOb-5 by the lower courts but also focused upon an
expansive interpretation of Rule 1 Ob-5 to further the anti-fraud purposes
of the securities acts.
2. Bankers Life: The Apogee of Supreme Court Expansion of Rule
lOb-5
Superintendent of Insurance of the State of New York v. Bankers
Life & Casualty Co. 68 was a very short and superficial opinion dealing
with a very complicated set of facts.69 In effect, a crook, Begole, pur-
chased all the stock of Manhattan Casualty Co. for $5 million. 70 Begole
and other conspirators then caused Manhattan Casualty to sell U.S.
Treasury bonds for approximately $5 million and appropriated the pro-
ceeds to pay Bankers Life the $5 million purchase price.71 Plaintiff
brought suit as liquidator of the assets of Manhattan Casualty.
The Second Circuit, in affirming the dismissal, stated that "no in-
vestor [was] injured" and that "[t]he purity of the security transaction and
the purity of the trading process were unsullied.72 The facts would seem
to support the Second Circuit's reasoning. Bankers Life sold the shares
of its subsidiary for $5 million. In fact, Bankers Life received $5 million,
apparently what the shares were worth. Therefore, there was no fraud in
the purchase of the Manhattan stock. With respect to the sale of bonds by
65. Nat I Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. at 467.
66. Id. at 468.
67. Id. at 468-69.
68. 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
69. Id. at 7-9.
70. Id. at 7-8.
71. Id. at8.
72. Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 430 F.2d 355, 361 (2d Cir.
1970), rev'd, 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
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Manhattan, apparently the bonds were worth what the buyer of the bonds
paid. Thus the buyer of the bonds was not defrauded. Moreover, since
the bonds were worth what Manhattan sold them for, Manhattan was not
defrauded in the bond transaction itself What happened was that the pro-
ceeds of the sale, instead of being deposited in Manhattan Casualty's
bank account, were misappropriated by the crooks.
The factor that enabled the Supreme Court to treat this as a securi-
ties case was that the asset that was sold was a financial asset, namely,
Treasury bonds. If, instead of being a Treasury bond, the circumstances
were the same except that the company whose stock was purchased was
a construction company and the asset sold was a large crane, this is no
way could be conjured to be a securities case.
In the case at bar, as the Second Circuit Court observed, no investor
was injured. This was a situation in which crooks embezzled from a
company they owned. The company became bankrupt and the state
agency sought to recover the embezzled funds. No one was deceived
about the value of any security. Each party to both of the securities trans-
actions received the price that each sought. It was a real stretch to treat
this as a securities case.
The Supreme Court acknowledged that, "[t]o be sure, the full mar-
ket price was paid for those bonds.,73 However, the Court added: "but
the seller was duped into believing that it, the seller, would receive the
proceeds. 74 The Court, understandably, was concerned that there was an
act "which operated as 'a fraud or deceit' on Manhattan.,75 But, embez-
zling the proceeds of the sale of a crane would also be a fraud or deceit.
However, it is not a securities fraud. This was a suit on behalf of credi-
tors of a corporation to recover funds embezzled by the owner of a cor-
poration. Cases such as this engendered concern about the development
of a federal law of corporations and about whether the fraud was "in
connection with" a securities transaction, as discussed below.
The Court stated that "Manhattan was injured as an investor through
a deceptive device which deprived it of any compensation for the sale of
its valuable block of securities7 6 and that "[t]he Act protects corpora-
tions as well as individuals who are sellers of a security.77 But the injury
here was not the typical injury that a defrauded investor would suffer.
Both the buyer and the seller were happy with the price. Manhattan Cas-
ualty's injury occurred when the proceeds were misappropriated.8
73. Bankers Life, 404 U.S. at 9.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 10.
77. Id.
78. The Court later recognized a related theory on which to find violations of federal securi-
ties laws, which it termed the "misappropriation theory." See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S.
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Moreover, Manhattan Casualty was a unique corporate investor. It
was not injured in a transaction involving its own equity securities, as in
Pappas v. Moss.79 Rather, it was, in effect, selling part of its "inventory,"
since the "inventory" of a financial institution in part consists of securi-
ties. As stated above, if Manhattan Casualty were a construction compa-
ny and sold its crane, this would not have been a Rule 1Ob-5 case. As
also stated above, the "investor," Manhattan Casualty, was not complain-
ing about the price received in the transaction.
The opinion contained other expansive language. The fact that the
fraud was committed by an officer, therefore breaching his fiduciary duty
to Manhattan, was "irrelevant" since § 10(b) bars fraud by "any per-
son.' 8° Also irrelevant was the fact that this was a private transaction,
i.e., one not conducted over an exchange or in the formal over-the-
counter market and that the proceeds were "misappropriated."'"
The Court did realize that there must be some connection between
the fraud and a securities transaction, since the Court acknowledged "that
Congress by § 10(b) did not seek to regulate transactions which consti-
tute no more than internal corporate mismanagement.,82 But the Court
provided little guidance as to when fraud is "in connection with" a secu-
rities transaction when it held that Manhattan's injury was the result of
"deceptive practices touching its sale of securities as an investor."
8 3
"Touching" is not a very precise legal standard.
Looking ahead to the next trilogy,84 the opinion would have been
sounder if it would have held that Manhattan Casualty was not deceived
since its sole shareholder, who controlled the board of directors, was the
perpetrator of the misappropriation of the proceeds of sale. Instead, it
created a tenuous connection between the fraud and the securities trans-
action, a connection even more tenuous than that which exists in insider
642, 652-53 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). In a case dealing with insider trading, the
Court found that a lawyer who traded on secret information he obtained while working for the corpo-
ration could be liable under Rule lOb-5. Id. at 653. Even though no harm was caused to those selling
to the insider, the Court found that the lawyer misappropriated information from his employer,
making him liable under Rule lOb-5. Id. at 653-54.
79. 393 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1968). In Pappas, the board of directors voted to sell shares of the
corporation to themselves at a price far below market value. Id. at 867. The Third Circuit found that
this sale violated Rule I Ob-5 because the board of directors deceived the independent shareholders
by selling stock cheaply to themselves. Id. at 869. The corporation itself was harmed because the
board of directors acted against the interest of the corporation by improperly selling securities, which
is different from misappropriating the assets of the corporation.
80. Bankers Life, 404 U.S. at 10 (internal quotation marks omitted).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 12.
83. Id. at 12-13 (emphasis added).
84. See infra Part 11 (discussing Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977), as one of
the trilogy's conservative decisions limiting the scope of Rule I Ob-5 in Part II.C).
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trading under the misappropriation theory, which will be explored in
connection with the third trilogy."
The result reached by the Bankers Life Court was not necessarily
dictated by the language of the statute, by existing case law, or by the
facts of the case, and could be criticized as being overly expansive in its
view of Rule 1Ob-5. However, in contrast to the latest trilogy, the Bank-
ers Life Court caused little disruption to existing statutory interpretation
and was not diametrically inconsistent with existing case law.
86
3. Affiliated Ute Citizens: Engendering Unnecessary Confusion
Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States87 once again dealt
with a complicated set of facts but unfortunately did so, not in a short
opinion, but rather in an unnecessarily long one. In Affiliated Ute Citi-
zens, a bank was appointed transfer agent for mixed-blood Indians with
regard to stock they owned in a corporation formed to hold assets for
which distribution would otherwise be impracticable.88 These assets in-
cluded transferred oil, gas and mineral rights, and unliquidated claims
against the U.S. government, pursuant to the Ute Indian Supervision
Termination Act.89 Each mixed-blood Ute was to receive ten shares of
Ute Distribution Corp. (UDC) stock; however, instead of distributing the
shares directly to the mixed-bloods, UDC deposited the shares with the
bank and the bank issued receipts to the shareholders.
90
The primary focus of the litigation was the sale by eighty-five
mixed-bloods to two assistant managers at one of the defendant-bank's
branch offices and to thirty-two other white men.91 Sales by the mixed-
bloods ranged from $300 to $700 per share.92 The district court deter-
mined that the value of the stock was $1,500 and found that the bank and
employees were liable to the mixed-bloods for damages.
93
Considering the state of the law respecting Rule 1Ob-5 at this time,
this should have been a rather routine securities case. The basic ethic of
Rule lob-5 is that it is a sin not only to lie but also to tell half-truths. This
is embodied in paragraph (b) of the Rule, which makes it unlawful: "To
make any untrue statement of a material fact [(a lie)] or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
85. See infra Part III.C (discussing the uncertain status of misappropriation as discussed in
Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987), and United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642
(1997)).
86. See infra Part IV.
87. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
88. Id. at 136.
89. 25 U.S.C. § 677a(f) (2012).
90. Affiliated Ute Citizens, 406 U.S. at 136-37.
91. Id. at 146-47.
92. Id. at 147.
93. Id. at 156-57.
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of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading [(a
half-truth)] . . .94
Since the employees represented that their offers were at the market
price, but did not disclose that there was a two-tiered market, this was a
typical "half-truth" case. On the other hand, the Supreme Court treated
this as a "silence" case, in which materiality substituted for reliance.
The Tenth Circuit, even though taking a constricted view of defend-
ants' liability, recounted that, as to the purchases personally made by the
bank employees, "the record shows that the individual defendants [repre-
sented] that the prevailing price or market price was the figure at which
their own purchase was made.,95 According to the Tenth Circuit, this
sufficed for liability on the personal purchases by the employees. How-
ever, the Tenth Circuit rejected liability for purchases by other white men
on the basis that, in the other purchases, the employees performed only
"ministerial" acts, such as preparing an affidavit that the mixed-bloods
had offered the shares to UDC.96
With respect to the purchases by the other white men, the Tenth
Circuit acknowledged that one employee stated "I contacted a number of
people [mixed-bloods] telling them that if they were interested in selling,
I was interested in offering the highest price."97 The Tenth Circuit also
stated that the employees actively encouraged a market for the UDC
stock.
98
Even under the Supreme Court's later, more restrictive definition of
who is a seller under the 1933 Act, the activity of the bank and its em-
ployees could constitute them as purchasers with regard to the mixed-
blood sales to other white men, because they solicited the purchases from
the mixed-bloods.99 Furthermore, since the employees, besides purchas-
94. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2013).
95. Reyos v. United States, 431 F.2d 1337, 1347 (10th Cir. 1970), affd in part, rev'd in part
sub nom. Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
96. Reyos, 431 F.2d at 1346.
97. Id. at 1347 (internal quotation marks omitted).
98. The court stated:
The record shows that the bank officials at the Roosevelt office of the defendant bank
were active in encouraging a market for the UDC stock among non-Indians. This was
probably not contemplated by the UDC-bank relationship. This gave rise to some indirect
benefits to the bank by way of increased deposits, but it did not constitute a violation of
any duty the bank may have had to the plaintiffs by contract or otherwise.
... The bank and the individual defendant employees had developed a market at the
Roosevelt Agency of the bank for UDC stock, received inquiries from time to time for
stock, and had customers of the bank who were prepared to make purchases from time to
time. The defendant bank and the individual defendants were thus entirely familiar with
the prevailing market for the shares at all material times.
Id. at 1345, 1347.
99. Cf Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 654-55 (1988) (rejecting the "substantial factor" test in
determining who is a seller under the 1933 Act, however, determining that someone who actually
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ing for their own account, were soliciting the mixed-bloods to sell and
were soliciting or receiving orders from other white men to buy, the situ-
ation could certainly fall within clause (c) of Rule lOb-5: "[engaging] in
any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate
as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security."'t Thus the defendants could be liable for fraud in
their selling activity, both with respect to their own sales and those that
they facilitated.
Consequently, the Court found a course of business embodying a
scheme to defraud on the following basis: "This is so because the de-
fendants devised a plan and induced the mixed-blood holders of UDC
stock to dispose of their shares without disclosing to them material facts
that reasonably could have been expected to influence their decisions to
sell."'0' So far so good. But the Court then went on to categorize the de-
fendants as "market makers," an unnecessary characterization: "The in-
dividual defendants, in a distinct sense, were market makers, not only for
their personal purchases constituting 8 1/3% of the sales, but for the oth-
er sales their activities produced. This being so, they possessed the af-
firmative duty under the Rule to disclose this fact to the mixed-blood
sellers."'
10 2
Not only did the Court refer to the defendants as market makers, but it
also cited Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co.,10 3 a case involving profes-
sional market makers, which had imposed a duty of disclosure upon
market makers, thus touching off a firestorm of concem.1°4 While the
bank and its employees were "making a market," they were not profes-
sional market makers.'0 5 Securities professionals who may make a mar-
solicited a sale could be a seller even though such person did not take title (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
100. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(c) (2013).
101. Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153 (1972).
102. Id. The Court also stated:
It is no answer to urge that, as to some of the petitioners, these defendants may have
made no positive representation or recommendation. The defendants may not stand mute
while they facilitate the mixed-bloods' sales to those seeking to profit in the non-Indian
market the defendants had developed and encouraged and with which they were fully fa-
miliar. The sellers had the right to know that the defendants were in a position to gain fi-
nancially from their sales and that their shares were selling for a higher price in that mar-
ket.
Id.
103. 438 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1970).
104. See Note, Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States-The Supreme Court Speaks on Rule
1Ob-5, 1973 UTAH L. REV. 119, 126-130 (1973) (explaining that while the Second Circuit in Chas-
ins noted that identification as a market maker was material, it never found a duty to disclose such
status-the Court's holding that market maker status must be disclosed should be limited to the facts
of this case); see also Arthur Fleischer, Jr. et al., An Initial Inquiry into the Responsibility to Disclose
Market Information, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 798, 846, 856-57 (1973) (discussing the problems created
by Affiliated Ute Citizens for market traders engaged in continuous trading activity due to unresolved
questions relating to the scope of this decision).
105. Market maker is defined by the SEC as an organization, association, or group of persons
that "(1) [b]rings together the orders for securities of multiple buyers and sellers; and (2) [u]ses
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW [Vol. 91:2
ket in several stocks and engage in hundreds of transactions a day were
concerned with what disclosure obligations could be imposed upon them
as a result of the Affiliated Ute Citizens decision.
This first trilogy clearly represented an expansive, possibly overly
expansive, approach to the scope of Rule 1Ob-5. The cases in the trilogy
could easily be characterized as "liberal." The analysis by the Court at
this point was not particularly rigorous and the Court appeared primarily
motivated to curb wrongdoing. Policy-protecting investors-was more
important than rigorous analysis.
II. THE SECOND, "CONSERVATIVE" TRILOGY: REACTION TO THE "OVER"
EXPANSION OF RULE 10B-5
The 1960s were a time of social and political upheaval, sparked in
large part by the civil rights movement and the Vietnam War,06 and to
some extent by reaction to the liberal decisions of the Warren Court.'07 In
1968, one issue upon which President Nixon campaigned was that he
would appoint a strict constructionist to be Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court.0 8 After his election, he made good on his promise, appointing
Warren Burger as Chief Justice in 1969.109 He also had three other ap-
established, non-discretionary methods (whether by providing a trading facility or by setting rules)
under which such orders interact with each other, and the buyers and sellers entering such orders
agree to the terms of a trade." 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-16(a) (2013).
106. See, e.g., STEPHEN FEINSTEIN, THE 1960S FROM THE VIETNAM WAR TO FLOWER POWER
60-61 (2006) (noting the significant events of the 1960s); ROBERT BUZZANCO, VIETNAM AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LIFE 1-9 (1999) (explaining the social and political movements of
the 1960s). The Vietnam War, along with the assassinations of President John F. Kennedy, Martin
Luther King, Jr., and Robert Kennedy; the riots after the King assassination; the Peace Movement of
the 1960s; the Women's Liberation movement of the 1960s; and the 1968 Chicago Democratic
Convention all had significant impact on politics of the 1960s. Id.
107. While Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), was a 1954 case, its progeny
carried over to the 1960s and later. Howard A. Glickstein, Remarks, The Impact of Brown v. Board
of Education and Its Progeny, 23 HOW. L.J. 51, 51 (1980). In addition, there were many other liberal
decisions. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 498-99 (1966) (holding that statements
obtained from defendants without full warning of constitutional rights were inadmissible as a viola-
tion of the Fifth Amendment); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 586-87 (1964) (holding existing and
proposed plans for apportionment of seats in the Alabama Legislature invalid under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343 (1963) (holding that defendants in a state
court criminal prosecution have the right to have counsel appointed); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
655 (1961) (holding evidence obtained by an unconstitutional search was inadmissible at trial, there-
by nullifying the conviction).
108. DONALD GRIER STEPHENSON JR., CAMPAIGNS AND THE COURT: THE U.S. SUPREME
COURT IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 181 (1999) (noting Nixon's promise to nominate Supreme
Court Justices who "would be strict constructionists who saw their duty as interpreting law and not
making law" and who "would see themselves as caretakers of the Constitution and servants of the
people, not super-legislators with a free hand to impose their social forces and political viewpoints
on the American people" (quoting ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON & DONALD GRIER STEPHENSON, JR.,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 513 (11 th ed. 1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
109. Warren E. Burger, 1969-1986, SUP. CT. HIST. SOC'Y,
http://www.supremecourthistory.org/history-of-the-court/chief-justices/warren-burger- 1969-1986/
(last visited Apr. 21, 2014).
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pointments: Justice Blackmun in 1970,"1 and Justices Powell and
Rehnquist in 1972."' Three of the four turned out to be moderate to
strong conservatives, but Justice Blackmun, to the chagrin of the con-
servatives, turned out to be a strong liberal, authoring the Court's opinion
in Roe v. Wade,'12 which has had political repercussions up to the pre-
sent.
Speaking of his appointments, President Nixon stated:
I consider my four appointments to the Supreme Court to have
been among the most constructive and far-reaching actions of my
presidency .... It is true that the men I appointed shared my con-
servative judicial philosophy and significantly affected the balance of
power that had developed on the Warren Court. But as individuals
they were each dedicated and able constitutional lawyers who often
disagreed on major cases. 13
The conservative shift that Nixon accomplished is reflected in the
next trilogy of cases. While the cases reflected movement away from the
prior expansionist approach of the federal courts to Rule 1Ob-5, they also
reflected, as President Nixon suggested, able constitutional lawyering.
A. Blue Chip Stamps: Adoption of the Birnbaum Standing Rule
The first case in this trilogy, Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores,14 involved a very unique set of facts. Normally, the concern in a
public offering is that the issuer, in preparing the registration statement
or other offering documents, will be unduly "optimistic" in order that the
investing public may be induced by misleading statements to buy and
thus to be euchred into a bad investment. The converse occurred in Blue
Chip Stamps.
Pursuant to a federal antitrust consent decree, "Old" Blue Chip and
its controlling shareholders were required to offer stock in the "New"
Blue Chip to retailers who had used the stamp service but were not
shareholders, in proportion to their past stamp usage."5 The offering to
the retailers would reduce the holdings of the nine retailers who previ-
110. Harry A. Blackmun, 1970-1994, SUP. CT. HIST. SOC'Y,
http://www.supremecourthistory.org/history-of-the-courl/associate-justices/harry-blackmun- 1970-
1994/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2014).
111. Lewis F. Powell, Jr., 1972-1987, SUP. CT. HIST. SOC'Y,
http://www.supremecourthistory.org/history-of-the-court/associate-justices/lewis-powell-jr- 1972-
1987/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2014); William H. Rehnquist, 1986-2005, SUP. CT. HIST. SOC'Y,
http://www.supremecourthistory.orghistory-of-the-court/chief-justices/william-rehnquist- 1986-
2005/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2014).
112. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
113. Jonathan Movroydis, Nixon Era Legal Experts Revisit High Court Nominations, NEW
NIXON (Nov. 21, 2011), http://blog.nixonfoundation.org/2011/11/nixon-era-officials-re-visit-the-
rehnquist-and-powell-nominations/.
114. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
115. Id. at 725-26.
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ously owned 90% of "Old" Blue Chip.' 16 Thus, it was to the advantage of
those who controlled "Old" Blue Chip that the retailers-to whom shares
in "New" Blue Chip were offered-not purchase such shares. Conse-
quently, according to plaintiff-retailers, defendants prepared a prospectus
that was fraudulently "pessimistic" in order to induce them not to buy. 
117
The so-called Birnbaum rule required that a plaintiff, in order to
have standing to bring an action under Rule lOb-5 (which required that
the fraud be "in connection with" a securities transaction), must have
been a purchaser or seller of securities.'"8 This rule was generally fol-
lowed in the lower courts, although certain exceptions were recog-
nized.1 9 Because plaintiffs had neither bought nor sold securities, the
district court in Blue Chip dismissed the complaint, 20 but a divided panel
of the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court on the basis that the instant
facts fell within an exception to the Birnbaum rule. 121
In the instant case, the Supreme Court declined to recognize an ex-
ception to the Birnbaum rule and made the rule an absolute standing re-
quirement, subject to no exceptions. The majority opinion concluded:
Were we to agree with the Court of Appeals in this case, we would
leave the Birnbaum rule open to endless case-by-case erosion de-
pending on whether a particular group of plaintiffs was thought by
the court in which the issue was being litigated to be sufficiently
more discrete than the world of potential purchasers at large to justify
an exception. We do not believe that such a shifting and highly fact-
orientated disposition of the issue of who may bring a damages claim
for violation of Rule 1Ob-5 is a satisfactory basis for a rule of liability
imposed on the conduct of business transactions.
122
There is no question that permitting persons who are not purchasers
or sellers to sue carries with it possibilities of abuse. Consider the Texas
116. Id.
117. Id. at 726-27.
118. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir. 1952). Birnbaum was short
and to the point; in contrast to the Blue Chip decision, which was almost fifty page long, Birnbaum
was only four pages.
119. See, e.g., Landy v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 486 F.2d 139, 156 (3d Cir. 1973) (holding that
a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief has standing after establishing a causal connection between the
alleged violations and alleged injury, even without showing a purchase of sale of the security); Mut.
Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 547 (2d Cir. 1967) (providing an exception to the
Birnbaum rule where the plaintiffs are seeking injunctive relief, whereby no sale or purchase of the
security is necessary where the plaintiff is seeking an injunction to prevent the wrongdoing); Vine v.
Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627, 637 (2d Cir. 1967) (granting standing because shareholder was
forced to sell his shares at a later time); see also 5B ARNOLD S. JACOBS, DISCLOSURE AND
REMEDIES UNDER THE SECURITIES LAWS § 9:5 (2013) (explaining the several exceptions to the
Birnbaum rule).
120. Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 339 F. Supp. 35, 40 (C.D. Cal. 1971), rev'd, 492
F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
121. Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 492 F.2d 136, 141-42 (9th Cir. 1973), rev'd,
421 U.S. 723 (1975).
122. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 755.
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Gulf Sulfur case previously discussed.123 The corporation published a
misleading press release; subsequent o the SEC action, private plaintiffs
who had sold their shares after that press release initiated suits and pre-
vailed. 24 Professor Ruder, later chairman of the SEC, opined that these
lawsuits worked to the disadvantage of the continuing shareholders who
did not sell on the basis of the press release.
25
Consider a pejorative spin on the foregoing. Assume the sharehold-
ers, prior to the press release, were composed of two groups: short-term
speculators and long-term investors. Upon the issuance of the press re-
lease, the speculators would sell and the investors would hold. The re-
covery of the speculators could devastate the capital of the corporation,
since corporations frequently trade at significant multiples of book value,
and thus the burden would fall upon those long-term investors who did
not sell.
126
But what if those who neither purchased nor sold could sue? Then
everybody in the world could potentially claim that they would have
bought "but for" the misleading press release. Such a situation would
wipe out the corporation.
At trial, probably only a few potential investors would succeed.
Discovery and cross-examination could demonstrate-as in the case of
Texas Gulf Sulfur127 -that the investor had never invested in mining
stocks, or that he had sought no research on the corporation, or that he
did not have the requisite liquidity to buy. But the litigation process itself
can be costly, time consuming, and disruptive to the corporation and its
management. Moreover, there is always the risk of success by the plain-
tiff. Accordingly, an unfounded lawsuit still may have settlement or
strike-suit value. As the concurring opinion pointed out:
Proving, after the fact, what 'one would have done' encompasses a
number of conjectural as well as subjective issues: would the offeree
have bought at all; how many shares would he have bought; how
long would he have held the shares; were there other 'buys' on the
market at the time that may have been more attractive even had the
123. See supra notes 36-45 and accompanying text.
124. SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 840-42 (2d Cir. 1968).
125. David S. Ruder, Texas Gulf Sulphur-The Second Round: Privity and State of Mind in
Rule 10b-5 Purchase and Sale Cases, 63 Nw. U. L. REV. 423, 426 (1968).
126. Assume a corporation trades at four times book value. If the book value is 100, then the
pre-press release market value would be 400. If the market value were to lose 10% (to 360) upon the
issuance of the press release but then increase 50% (to 540) after a corrective press release, the
measure of damages would be $180 per share. If 20% of the shares traded between the two press
releases, the corporation would lose 36% of its capital base. This could have a devastating impact
upon the corporation and its patient investors. Judge Friendly, concurring in Texas Gulf Sulphur,
warned that this type of litigation could "lead to large judgments, payable in the last analysis by
innocent investors, for the benefit of speculators and their lawyers." 401 F.2d at 867 (Friendly, J.,
concurring).
127. Id. at 851 (majority opinion).
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offeree known the facts; did he in fact use his available funds (if any)
more advantageously by purchasing something else?
128
Judge Hufstedler, dissenting in the Ninth Circuit below, put the is-
sue into a concise perspective: "although [strike suits] are difficult to
prove at trial, they are even more difficult to dispose of before trial.'
' 29
By framing Birnbaum as an absolute standing requirement, the majority
insured that meritless litigation brought by a person who neither pur-
chased nor sold could be disposed very simply and inexpensively, merely
by filing a motion to dismiss for lack of standing.
In Blue Chip Stamps, the statutory analysis was sound: the statute
and Rule lOb-5 both spoke of "purchase or sale"; Rule lOb-5 was de-
rived from § 17 of the 1933 Act, which covered offerees-a phrase de-
leted from the Rule;'30 and the SEC had unsuccessfully sought to have
Congress expand § 10(b) to cover "any attempt to purchase or sell, any
security."'131 Accordingly, the judicial craftsmanship was well done.
Moreover, the policy concern was legitimate: "If § l0b were extended to
embrace offers to sell, the number of persons claiming to have been of-
ferees could be legion."'
' 32
The only criticism that could be levied against Blue Chip Stamps is
that the Supreme Court chose to bar a potentially meritorious case on the
basis that there might be subsequent meretricious ones, thus raising the
question whether this was the proper vehicle to adopt the current policy.
Because the defendants were required to offer shares only to a particular
group of plaintiffs, the potential liability was not to the world at large,
but only to a discrete group.
B. Ernst & Ernst: Scienter Mandated by Statute-A Lesson in Adminis-
trative Law
The conservative trend continued with Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfeld-
er,133 where the Supreme Court rejected negligence as a basis for a Rule
1Ob-5 action and required a state of mind for the defendant that embraced
"scienter." In a footnote, the Court defined scienter as a "mental state
embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud."'' 34 However, the
128. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 758 n.2 (1975) (Powell, J., con-
curring).
129. Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 492 F.2d 136, 147 n.9 (9th Cir. 1973)
(Hufstedler, J., dissenting), rev'd, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
130. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2012) ("It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or
sale of any securities . . . or any security-based swap agreement .... ") (emphasis added), with 15
U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012) ("[It is unlawful to] use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security .... ").
131. 103 CONG. REC. 11636 (1957) (internal quotation mark omitted).
132. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 758-59 (Powell, J., concurring).
133. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
134. Id. at 193 n.12.
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Court left the door open for private suits to be based upon a standard less
than subjective intent to defraud by adding:
In certain areas of the law recklessness is considered to be a form of
intentional conduct for purposes of imposing liability for some act.
We need not address here the question whether, in some circum-
stances, reckless behavior is sufficient for civil liability under § l0b
and Rule 1Ob-5.1
35
While President Nixon had succeeded in changing the liberal incli-
nation of the Supreme Court, the circuit courts retained their "liberal"
perspective into the 1980s, when President Reagan in effect imposed a
litmus test upon all judicial nominees.136 Consequently, in short order, all
circuits adopted recklessness as the standard under Rule 1 Ob-5.1
37
Interestingly, the opinion dealt with a lawsuit against an aider and
abettor.138 Leston Nay was the president and controlling shareholder of
First Securities;1 39 however, on the side, he ran a Ponzi scheme analo-
gous to that of Bernie Madoff,140 in which he induced investors to invest
in escrow accounts that he personally managed and which he represented
would yield a high rate of return. To avoid detection, he had a policy that
no one could open his mail while he was gone from the office (the "mail
135. Id.
136. 1 can speak from personal experience. When I was interviewed by the Justice Department
in connection with a judicial appointment, concern was raised about an article I had written, Charles
W. Murdock, Civil Rights of the Mentally Retarded: Some Critical Issues, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW.
133 (1972). While the title just as easily could have been "A Cost/Benefit Approach to the Care and
Education of the Retarded," it was difficult for those interviewing me to get past any expanded
notion of civil rights. See also Stuart Taylor Jr., The One-Pronged Test for Federal Judges, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 22, 1984, at 45 (stating that Reagan put ideology first in filling judicial vacancies).
137. Phillips v. LCI Int'l, Inc., 190 F.3d 609, 620 (4th Cir. 1999); SEC v. Steadman, 967 F.2d
636, 641 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Harris v. Union Elec. Co., 787 F.2d 355, 369 n.12 (8th Cir. 1986); White
v. Sanders, 689 F.2d 1366, 1367 n.4 (11 th Cir. 1982) (per curiam); McLean v. Alexander, 599 F.2d
1190, 1197-98 (3d Cir. 1979); Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1023 (6th Cir.
1979); Edward J. Mawod & Co. v. SEC, 591 F.2d 588, 596 (10th Cir. 1979); Nelson v. Serwold, 576
F.2d 1332, 1337 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam); Cook v. Avien, Inc., 573 F.2d 685, 692 (1st Cir.
1978); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 44 (2d Cir. 1978); Sundstrand Corp. v.
Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1044 (7th Cir. 1977); Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1020 (5th
Cir. 1977).
138. The Court reviewed judgment on whether civil liability exists for aiding and abetting.
Ernst, 425 U.S. at 191 n.7, 191-93. Eighteen years later, in Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First
Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., the Court struck down aiding and abetting liability under Rule lOb-
5, without recognizing how Ernst & Ernst undercut its analysis. 511 U.S. 164, 177 (1994). See infra
Part IV.A.
139. Ernst, 425 U.S. at 189.
140. Bernard Madoff was seen by most on Wall Street as a top trader who consistently
achieved high returns for his clients while charging very low fees, who was able to maintain his
success in both bull and bear markets. In December 2008, he was arrested for what he described as
"a giant Ponzi scheme." Diana B. Henriques & Zachery Kouwe, U.S. Arrests a Top Trader in Vast
Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2008, at AI (internal quotation mark omitted). Mr. Madoff had for
years been paying returns to certain investors using money he received from other investors. When a
few clients sought to make a large withdrawal from their accounts, the scheme collapsed. Losses
were estimated to be as high as $50 billion. Id.; see also Diana B. Henriques, U.S. Proposes 150
Years for Madoff, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2009, at B3.
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rule"). 141 After he committed suicide, First Securities became bankrupt,
and Ernst & Ernst was charged by plaintiff for aiding and abetting Nay's
fraud by not uncovering the mail rule.142 Ernst & Ernst was not charged
with intentional misconduct but rather "inexcusable negligence."'
143
Once again, the opinion exemplified sound judicial reasoning. The
Court first turned to the language of the statute. Section 10 of the 1934
Act makes it illegal "[t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security ... any manipulative or deceptive device or con-
trivance" in contravention of SEC rules.'44 In analyzing this language,
the Court concluded that "[t]he words 'manipulative or deceptive' used
in conjunction with 'device or contrivance' strongly suggest that § 10(b)
was intended to proscribe knowing or intentional misconduct."'145 The
Court then looked at the legislative history of the 1934 Act and found
little bearing upon the interpretation of § 10.146 However, what little his-
tory existed clearly was not inconsistent with the approach taken by the
Court. 147
Much of the opinion addressed and rebutted arguments by the SEC
that Rule lOb-5 encompassed negligent conduct. The Court extensively
addressed the SEC's argument that the structure of the securities acts
supported § 10 sounding in negligence. The SEC pointed out that § 9(e)
requires "willful[] participat[ion]' 141 while § 10(b) is "not by its terms
explicitly restricted to will[ing], knowing, or purposeful conduct."'149 In
response, the Court embarked upon its own analysis of the structure of
the securities acts.
Looking first to the 1933 Act, the Court noted that the express lia-
bility provisions all sounded in negligence,150 but also contained proce-
dural protections, such as requiring plaintiff to post a bond 151 or imposing
141. Ernst, 425 U.S. at 190 (internal quotation mark omitted).
142. Id. at 189-90.
143. Id. at 190 n.5 (internal quotation marks omitted).
144. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).
145. Ernst, 425 U.S. at 197.
146. Id. at 201-07.
147. In the concluding portion of its opinion, the Court stated: "When a statute speaks so
specifically in terms of manipulation and deception, and of implementing devices and contrivanc-
es-the commonly understood terminology of intentional wrongdoing-and when its history reflects
no more expansive intent, we are quite unwilling to extend the scope of the statute to negligent
conduct." Id. at 214.
148. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(f) (2012).
149. Ernst, 425 U.S. at 207.
150. Section 11 (b), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (2012), imposes almost absolute liability on the issuer,
but directors, underwriters, experts and officers who sign the registration statement are not liable if
they can establish a due diligence defense. Ernst, 425 U.S. at 208 n.26. A similar defense exists
under § 12(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2) (2012), and controlling person liability under § 15, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77o (2012), may be avoided if the control person had no "reasonable ground(s) to believe" in the
facts rendering the control person liable. Ernst, 425 U.S. at 208 (alteration in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Basically, a person who can establish that he or she was not negligent will
not be liable.
151. Id. at 208-10.
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a shortened statute of limitation. 52 Because Rule 1Ob-5 protects buyers
as well as sellers, plaintiff-buyers could choose to bring suit under Rule
lOb-5, instead of the aforesaid express liability provisions, and thereby
short circuit these statutory protections for defendants in the case of neg-
ligent wrongdoing. The Court stated:
We think these procedural limitations indicate that the judicially cre-
ated private damages remedy under § 10(b) which has no comparable
restrictions-cannot be extended, consistently with the intent of Con-
gress, to actions premised on negligent wrongdoing. Such extension
would allow causes of action covered by §§ 11, 12(2), and 15 to be
brought instead under § 10(b) and thereby nullify the effectiveness of
the carefully drawn procedural restrictions on these express ac-
tions. 153
The Court addressed the 1934 Act provisions in a footnote.15 4 Other
than § 16(b), which was directed at officers, directors, and ten percent
shareholders, and which essentially created absolute liability for "insid-
er" trading encompassed within a six-month period,155 the Court opined
that all other express liability provisions had state of mind conditions.
Section 9(e), as stated above, requires willful participation; § 18, dealing
with filing misleading statements with the SEC, requires knowledge; and
§ 20, dealing with controlling person liability, requires that the control-
ling person "induce" the controlled person's act.156 These latter two pro-
visions are actually phrased as affirmative defenses.
In effect, the Supreme Court recognized that, if Rule 1 Ob-5 sounded
in negligence, Rule 10b-5, like Sherwin Williams's paint, could "cover
the earth"'157 and make the express liability provisions superfluous.
The SEC also argued that the language of subsections (b) and (c) of
Rule lOb-5, standing alone, support a negligence standard. 58 This argu-
ment, in part, was also the rationale for the dissent.59 The majority easily
disposed of an argument based upon the language of Rule lOb-5, rather
than on the statute, by recounting well-settled administrative law princi-
ples. The authority of the SEC to promulgate rules is limited by the rule
152. 15 U.S.C. § 77m (2012).
153. Ernst, 425 U.S. at 210 (footnote omitted).
154. Id. at 209 n.28.
155. Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2012). The Court apparently saw Congress holding "insiders" to a
higher standard than that applicable to persons generally.
156. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78(i)(f), 78(r)(a), 78(t)(a) (2012).
157. SHERWIN-WILLIAMs, http://www.sherwin-williams.com/ (last visited Apr. 22, 2014)
(depicting the company logo containing the slogan "cover the earth").
158. Ernst, 425 U.S. at 212. In Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 690 (1980), the Court held that
similar language in a statute, § 17 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q (2012), sounded in negligence,
but the same language in Rule I Ob-5 could not because the interpretation of the rule was controlled
by the statute, § 10(b).
159. Ernst, 425 U.S. at 216-17 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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making authority conferred by the statute.16° The rule must implement
the statute, not override it. Thus, if the statute gives the SEC power to
proscribe fraud, the SEC does not have the power to proscribe negli-
gence. The rule cannot be broader than the authority conferred by the
statute. This probably accounts for the half-hearted dissent.
C. Santa Fe: Harmonizing State and Federal Law and Putting Closure
on a Federal Law of Corporations
Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green161 is the last case in the trilogy of
thoughtful and well-crafted conservative decisions limiting the scope of
Rule lOb-5. As will be discussed, the policy perspective envisioned in
the opinion actually played out in the controversy that gave rise not just
to the Santa Fe opinion but to two other cases as well. 162
Santa Fe involved the short form merger of a subsidiary of Santa
Fe, Kirby Lumber Corp.,163 with another subsidiary of Santa Fe. No vote
of the shareholders of Kirby was necessary, but the shareholders were
entitled to ten days' notice of the effectiveness of the merger and had the
right to dissent and receive the judicially appraised value of their
shares.'64 Santa Fe furnished Kirby minority shareholders with an infor-
mation statement containing an appraisal of the Kirby assets. While the
physical assets were appraised at $640 per share, Morgan Stanley valued
the shares at $125 per share and Santa Fe offered the minority sharehold-
ers $150 per share.'
65
Rather than following through on their appraisal rights,166 plaintiffs
in the Santa Fe case filed suit under Rule lOb-5, alleging a scheme to
defraud the minority shareholders out of the difference between the value
of the physical assets and the $150 per share offered by Santa Fe. Both
the district court 67 and the Second Circuit168 viewed plaintiffs' complaint
as presenting two grounds for liability: (1) gross undervaluation, and (2)
160. See Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co. v. Comm'r, 297 U.S. 129, 134 (1936) ("A regulation
which ... operates to create a rule out of harmony with the statute, is a mere nullity."); see also
Miller v. United States, 294 U.S. 435, 439 (1935) (noting an administrative agency cannot create a
rule that regulates anything beyond the what Congress enabled it to regulate through the plain mean-
ing of the statute).
161. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
162. See infra text accompanying notes 182-84.
163. Kirby was actually a subsidiary of a subsidiary and another subsidiary was formed which
merged into Kirby, such that Kirby was the surviving corporation. The net effect of the corporate
machinations was that the majority shareholders of Kirby were cashed out, and Santa Fe now had a
wholly owned subsidiary. Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 465.
164. Id. at 465-66.
165. Id. at 466.
166. Initially, plaintiffs petitioned for appraisal, but then withdrew the petition and filed the
federal lawsuit. Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 391 F. Supp. 849, 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), affd in part,
rev'd in part, 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
167. Id. at 852.
168. Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283, 1285 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S. 462
(1977).
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squeezing out the minority without a business purpose. Both courts
agreed that gross undervaluation without any accompanying misrepre-
sentation or lack of disclosure would not be actionable under Rule lOb-
5.169 Although the district court held that Delaware law did not require a
business purpose for a squeeze-out merger,I17 the Second Circuit held
that neither misrepresentation nor nondisclosure was necessary for a
Rule lob-5 action:
We hold that a complaint alleges a claim under Rule lob-5 when it
charges, in connection with a Delaware short-form merger, that the
majority has committed a breach of its fiduciary duty to deal fairly
with minority shareholders by effecting the merger without any justi-
fiable business purpose. The minority shareholders are given no prior
notice of the merger, thus having no opportunity to apply for injunc-
tive relief, and the proposed price to be paid is substantially lower
than the appraised value reflected in the Information Statement. 171
The Supreme Court, in reversing the Second Circuit, took essential-
ly the same tack it took in Ernst & Ernst. It first looked to the language
of the statute, focusing upon the words "manipulative or deceptive" in
conjunction with "device or contrivance,"'' 72 and then reasserted that a
rule cannot exceed the power conferred by Congress pursuant to the stat-
ute.173 Consequently, the Court concluded that "the claim of fraud and
fiduciary breach in this complaint states a cause of action under any part
of Rule lob-5 only if the conduct alleged can be fairly viewed as 'ma-
nipulative or deceptive."",174 Since the district court found that here was
no omission or misstatement of a material fact, plaintiffs had no cause of
action.
175
The opinion could have concluded at this point but the Court also
undertook a Cort v. Ash17 6 analysis to drive home the point that breaches
of fiduciary duty, unaccompanied by deception, are not within a private
cause of action under Rule lob-5. The Court asserted that the "funda-
mental purpose" of the securities laws was to implement a policy of "full
and fair disclosure."'177 If there is full disclosure, then "the fairness of the
169. 533 F.2d at 1291; 391 F. Supp. at 854.
170. Compare Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 715 (Del. 1983) (explaining that corpo-
rations need not have a valid business purpose when effectuating a merger), with Coggins v. New
Eng. Patriots Football Club, Inc., 492 N.E.2d 1112, 1119 (Mass. 1986) (holding that under Massa-
chusetts law, defendants must prove (1) the merger was for a legitimate business purpose, and (2) it
was fair to the minority), and Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 490 F.2d 563, 570 (5th Cir. 1974)
(stating that the Georgia Corporation Merger Statute requires corporations to show a valid business
purpose for a merger in order to avoid the statute's anti-fraud provisions).
171. Green, 533 F.2d at 1291.
172. Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 472 (internal quotation marks omitted).
173. Id. at 472-73.
174. Id. at 473-74.
175. Id. at 474.
176. See 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
177. Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 477-78.
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terms of the transaction is at most a tangential concern."'78 Consequently,
recognizing a cause of action merely for breach of fiduciary duty is not
necessary to fulfill the purposes of the securities laws. Moreover, breach
of fiduciary duty is an area traditionally relegated to state law. Accord-
ingly, the Court rejected the possibility that Rule lOb-5 could be used to
create a federal law of corporations:
Federal courts applying a "federal fiduciary principle" under Rule
1Ob-5 could be expected to depart from state fiduciary standards at
least to the extent necessary to ensure uniformity within the federal
system. Absent a clear indication of congressional intent, we are re-
luctant to federalize the substantial portion of the law of corporations
that deals with transactions in securities, particularly where estab-
lished state policies of corporate regulation would be overridden. 1
79
In effect, the Court was harmonizing federal and state law. The pur-
pose of federal law is to promote disclosure.80 Where, as here, full dis-
closure is made, there is no federal cause of action. However, if the fully
disclosed facts reveal a basis for breach of fiduciary duty or other state
remedy, the plaintiff has access to state law for a substantive remedy.
This is exactly what occurred in the Santa Fe situation. While plain-
tiffs in the case before the Supreme Court failed in their federal action
because Santa Fe made full disclosure, including the fact that the physi-
cal assets were worth $640 per share,'81 substantially more than the $150
per share offered by Santa Fe, plaintiffs in two other lawsuits took ad-
vantage of this disclosure to initiate appraisal and breach of fiduciary
duty actions. In a case filed in Delaware under the appraisal statute,
plaintiffs recovered $254.40 per share;8 2 on the other hand, in New
York, plaintiffs filed a breach of fiduciary duty case, but were not suc-
cessful because, as required by Delaware law, there was no fraud, mis-
representation, or blatant overreaching.83 Thus, the factual situation
demonstrates the workability of Santa Fe limiting Rule lob-5 actions to
those involving deception because the disclosure provided by federal law
would enable a plaintiff to take advantage of common law remedies.184
178. Id at 478.
179. Id. at 479 (footnote omitted).
180. Id. at 477-78.
181. Id. at 466.
182. Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 413 A.2d 137, 140 (Del. 1980).
183. Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 514 N.E.2d 105, 113 (N.Y. 1987) (holding that the plain-
tiff's acceptance of the offer by Santa Fe was not made in reliance on any deception or omission on
the part of defendants but was, on the contrary, the result of an informed judgment that resorting to
an appraisal proceeding would be too costly and time-consuming).
184. Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1108 (1991), undercut this schema
somewhat by not finding maldisclosure actionable when the minority shareholders did not have
sufficient votes to defeat the merger proposal. As Justice Kennedy pointed out in his dissent, in this
situation there is all the more need for full disclosure. Id. at 1118 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). He
asserted that the majority had engaged in "a sort of guerilla warfare to restrict a well-established
implied right of action." Id. at 1115.
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The second trilogy, while "curbing" the expansion of Rule lOb-5 lit-
igation, did so in a responsible manner that was consistent with both the
policy and the language of the securities laws. The securities laws were
designed to protect investors; Blue Chip Stamps precluded a "non-
investor" from claiming he or she would have bought "but for" some
alleged misstatement, while using the benefit of hindsight. Ernst & Ernst
focused on the language of the statute, asserting that an administrative
rule cannot be broader than its statutory authorization. It also harmonized
the scope of an implied action with the express civil actions created by
Congress. Finally, Santa Fe recognized that the focus of the securities
laws is upon disclosure, and that a federal action should not lie where the
issuer has made full and complete disclosure, even if it has disclosed a
breach of fiduciary duty. State and federal law were harmonized since
the federal disclosure could provide the information necessary to assert
state remedies.
III. THE INSIDER TRADING TRILOGY
The next trilogy of cases, Chiarella v. United States,'85 Dirks v.
SEC,186 and Carpenter v. United States,'87 all dealt with insider trading
and represent a significant departure from the sound reasoning reflected
in the previous trilogy. They also represent a move toward constraining
the scope of Rule 1Ob-5 in circumstances where its broad application
would have furthered the policy of the securities laws. While the previ-
ous trilogy put a brake upon the unwarranted expansion of Rule 1 Ob-5, it
did so by focusing on the language of the statute, which limits the scope
of the rule; moreover, it did so in a manner that was not aimed at permit-
ting fraudulent activity to escape accountability.
On the other hand, as will be demonstrated, the insider trading trilo-
gy and the final trilogy dealing with collateral participants have encour-
aged illicit activity and undermined the purpose of the securities laws "to
ensure the fair and honest functioning of impersonal national securities
markets where common-law protections have proved inadequate,' 88 or,
as Congress has stated, "to assure that dealing in securities is fair and
without undue preferences or advantages among investors."'
8 9
A. Chiarella: The Start of Retrenchment
Chiarella dealt with an employee of Pandick Press, a financial
printer.1 90 He worked on five documents dealing with corporate takeover
185. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
186. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
187. 484 U.S. 19 (1987). The Court, in United States v. O'Hagan, later accepted the misappro-
priation theory. 521 U.S. 642, 650 (1997); see infra text accompanying note 302.
188. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 248 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
189. H.R. REP. No. 94-229, at 91 (1975) (Conf. Rep.); S. REP. No. 94-75, at 3 (1975).
190. 445 U.S. at 224 (majority opinion).
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W RE VIEW
bids and, while the names of the bidder and the target were not disclosed
to the printer until the night before the bids were made public, Chiarella
was able to discern their identity and make pre-bid purchases at what was
then the market price.191 After the takeover bids were made public and
the stock price rose, he sold the shares and realized a substantial gain.'
92
Chiarella was first investigated by the SEC, and subsequently entered
into a consent decree in which he disgorged his profits.'93 He was then
indicted by the U.S. Attorney and convicted on seventeen counts of vio-
lating Rule lOb-5.194 The majority and the dissent viewed the scope of
the indictment and the jury instructions from very different perspectives.
According to the Court, the jury, pursuant to the district court's
charge, could convict Chiarella if it "found that he willfully failed to
inform sellers of target company securities that he knew of a forthcoming
takeover bid that would make their shares more valuable."1 95 The Court
opined that it could not affirm Chiarella's conviction "without recogniz-
ing a general duty between all participants in market transactions to for-
go actions based on material, nonpublic information,"' 196 or, in other
words, a broad duty to the market as a whole. This the Court refused to
do. Instead, it asserted that silence1 97 is actionable only where there is a
duty to disclose and such a duty arises only from a common law relation-
ship of trust and confidence between the parties to the transaction. 198
The Court's decision is problematic in several respects. First of all,
the Court applied what it describes as the "catchall" provision of the
1934 Securities Exchange Act. 199 The reason why the securities laws
were enacted was because the common law was inadequate. Yet, the
Court used the common law to constrict the scope of the securities laws.
This is catch-22 reasoning. The Court opined that, although Rule lOb-5
is a catchall provision, "what it catches must be fraud.' '20° But there is no
question that Chiarella engaged in fraudulent activity. As Chief Justice
Burger eloquently stated in his dissent: "Chiarella, working literally in
the shadows of the warning signs in the printshop, misappropriated-
stole to put it bluntly-valuable nonpublic information entrusted to him
in the utmost confidence.2 °1
191. Id.
192. Over the course of 14 months, Chiarella made a profit of more than $30,000. Id. An
attorney who worked on the case told me that the SEC was tipped to Chiarella's activity by a jilted
boyfriend who thought his romance was undercut by his rival's new found wealth.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 225.
195. Id. at 226.
196. Id at 233.
197. The court treated this case as a "silence" case since Chiarella made no disclosure before
he traded. Id. at 226.
198. Id. at 230.
199. Id. at 226.
200. Id. at 234-35.
201. Id. at 245 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger also pointed out that:
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In this connection, the Court positively cited Cady, Roberts & Co.
202
to support its position, without appreciating that Cady, Roberts in fact
undermined its opinion. As discussed earlier, Cady, Roberts dealt with a
bad news situation in which an insider would sell, very likely, to some-
one who was not a shareholder.2 3 The defendant in Cady, Roberts ar-
gued that there was not a common law fiduciary duty by a corporate in-
sider to someone who was not a shareholder. On the other hand, the SEC
took the position that the securities laws were not constrained by com-
mon law concepts.
Cady, Roberts involved a "traditional insider" as tipper and "com-
pany-specific" information. Tender offers present a different paradigm.
The diagram set forth in Exhibit A illustrates the situation.20 4 Below the
bidder is what is sometimes referred to as "temporary insiders," such as
attorneys and investment bankers. And the relevant information is not
company-specific, but rather "market information."
The majority focused upon the fact that Chiarella had no relation-
ship, and thus no common law duty to the shareholders of the target cor-
poration.°5 Chief Justice Burger, with a conservative "tough on crime"
perspective, focused upon the fact that Chiarella stole confidential infor-
mation from his employer to obtain an illicit gain.206 This was the essen-
tial difference between the majority and minority positions.
While the Court's majority, in applying "disclose or abstain," found
an obligation to disclose only when the defendant owed a duty to the
207person on the other side of the transaction, Justice Burger found the
duty to disclose became operative because of the illicit manner in which
the defendant obtained the information.208 He found support from Profes-
sor Keeton:
[The] way in which the buyer acquires the information which he
conceals from the vendor should be a material circumstance. The in-
formation might have been acquired as the result of his bringing to
Chiarella, himself, testified that he obtained his informational advantage by decoding
confidential material entrusted to his employer by its customers [and that Chiarella's
counsel conceded that]...
... "Mr. Chiarella got on the stand and he conceded, he said candidly, 'I used clues I got
while I was at work. I looked at these various documents and I deciphered them and I de-
coded them and I used that information as a basis for purchasing stock.' There is no ques-
tion about that. We don't have to go through a hullabaloo about that. It is something he
concedes. There is no mystery about that."
Id. at 244-45.
202. Id. at 241-42 (discussing Cady, Roberts & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 34-6668, 1961
WL 60638 (Nov. 8, 1961)).
203. See supra text accompanying notes 46-55.
204. See infra Exhibit A.
205. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 231 (majority opinion).
206. Id. at 244-45 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
207. Id. at 227 (majority opinion).
208. Id. at 240 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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bear a superior knowledge, intelligence, skill or technical judgment;
it might have been acquired by mere chance; or. it might have been
acquired by means of some tortious action on his part.... Any time
information is acquired by an illegal act it would seem that there
should be a duty to disclose that information.
209
Justice Burger also found support in the repeated use of "any" in the
statute: section (b) made illegal actions by "any person engaged in any
fraudulent scheme,"2 10 and concluded that "congressional concern was
[not] limited to trading by 'corporate insiders' . . . [and that] Congress
cannot have intended one standard of fair dealing for 'white collar' in-
siders and another for the 'blue collar' level."
211
Finally, Justice Burger looked at legislative history which indicated
that the purpose of the securities laws was to prohibit "manipulative and
deceptive practices which have been demonstrated to fulfill no useful
function,"21 2 and to "assure that dealing in securities is fair and without
undue preferences or advantages among investors."21 3 He then concluded
that: "An investor who purchases securities on the basis of misappropri-
ated nonpublic information possesses just such an 'undue' trading ad-
vantage; his conduct quite clearly serves no useful function except his
own enrichment at the expense of others.,
214
Justice Burger's approach makes more sense than that of the majori-
ty, which is predicated upon the existence, or lack thereof, of a common
law fiduciary duty. Since the securities laws were enacted because of the
shortcomings of the common law in dealing with securities fraud, why
then look to the common law to interpret the securities laws? On the oth-
er hand, Justice Burger was guided by the policy behind the securities
laws. As the SEC stated in Cady, Roberts, in view of the "broad language
of the anti-fraud provisions[,] we are not to be circumscribed by fine
distinctions and rigid classifications.,215 Accordingly, the SEC conclud-
ed:
Whatever distinctions may have existed at common law based on the
view that an officer or director may stand in a fiduciary relationship
to existing stockholders from whom he purchases but not to members
of the public to whom he sells, it is clearly not appropriate to intro-
209. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting W. Page Keeton, Fraud-Concealment and Non-
Disclosure, 15 TEX. L. REV. 1, 25-26 (1936)).
210. Id.
211. Id. at 240-41.
212. Id. at 241 (quoting S. REP. No. 73-792, at 6 (1934)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
213. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-229, at 91 (1975) (Conf. Rep.)) (internal quotation mark
omitted).
214. Id.
215. Cady, Roberts & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 34-6668, 1961 WL 60638, at *4 (Nov.
8, 1961).
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duce these into the broader anti-fraud concepts embodied in the secu-
rities acts.
216
Justice Burger's position is not quite a "possession" standard. But it is
not burdensome to expect that corporate insiders and securities profes-
sionals should know that it is illegal for them to trade on material, non-
public information. The doctrine of scienter would limit the persons sub-
ject to liability. This, of course, would make it easier to surmount a mo-
tion to dismiss, whereas Justice Burger sought to encourage disposing of
litigation on a motion to dismiss in Blue Chip Stamps.
The majority may have been led astray by the inept phrase "disclose
or abstain," which originated in the Texas Gulf Sulphur case.217 The fal-
lacy with phrasing the duty as disclose or abstain is that, invariably, the
person subject to this adage has a duty not to disclose. For example, in
Texas Gulf Sulphur, the employees had a duty to their employer not to
disclose while the corporation assessed the scope of the discovery and
obtained additional mineral rights. Thus, the employee did not have the
option of disclosing or abstaining.
218
The Second Circuit should have articulated the employees' obliga-
tion as "abstain until disclosable." If that were the jargon with which the
federal courts were grappling, the Supreme Court might have upheld
Chiarella's conviction since this latter standard does not implicate any
duty to the shareholders of the target company. Holding a person like
Chiarella accountable for stealing his employer's information in order to
obtain an informational advantage is certainly consistent with the securi-
ties law policies recounted by Justice Burger.
In the long run, Justice Burger's position prevailed. His closing
comment that Chiarella stole valuable nonpublic information that was
entrusted to him2 9 became the basis for the misappropriation theory.22° A
year later, the misappropriation theory was the basis of a conviction in
United States v. Newman,221 and four years later, in a case involving facts
that were a clone of those in Chiarella, the conviction of an employee of
a financial printing firm was upheld on the basis that he "misappropriat-
ed-stole to put it bluntly-valuable nonpublic information" entrusted to
222him by his employer.
216. Id. at *5.
217. See supra text accompanying notes 35-45.
218. The Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983), discussion, infra note 243, is one of the rare
instances where "disclose or abstain" might actually work.
219. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 245 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
220. See id (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
221. 664 F.2d 12, 17 (2d Cir. 1981).
222. SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 201 (2d Cir. 1984) (internal quotation marks omitted).
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
B. Dirks: A Clear Policy Choice Favoring Greed over Investors
1. The Basic Facts
Dirks v. SEC2 23 involved a very strange and convoluted set of facts,
which may, in part, account for the divergence between the majority and
minority opinions.224 It is as if the members of the Supreme Court were
watching two different movies: the majority seeing a hero and the dissent
seeing a villain.
The underlying facts were close to unbelievable. Equity Funding
was an insurance company that sought to increase its earnings.225 Unfor-
tunately, not enough real people were buying its policies. So, it began
226creating people, who then bought policies so as to increase revenue.
Management understood that, in the insurance business, there are both
inflows and outflows, as people die and the beneficiaries collect on the
policies. Consequently, Equity Funding also killed some people-
22fortunately, these persons were only fictitious to begin with. 27
In early 1973, a disgruntled former executive, Ronald Secrist,
tipped Raymond Dirks, an officer of a broker-dealer firm who special-
ized in insurance company securities, about the scam and asked him to
publicize it. 228 Secrist estimated that, by 1972, Equity Funding had
40,000 fictitious policies, about one-third of its business.229 Dirks inter-
viewed Equity Funding employees and, although management denied the
230charges, some employees corroborated Secrist's story.
Dirks then took two divergent courses of action. He disclosed what
he had learned to a number of clients and investors, including five insti-
tutional investors that subsequently liquidated more than $16 million in
223. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
224. See id. at 648-52.
225. See id. at 649.
226. Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824, 829 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
227. The SEC found:
Since 1970, EFCA had been creating fictitious life insurance policies, known to insiders
as "Y business." These policies were sold to reinsurers for an amount equal to 80% of
first-year premiums. By this method, management hoped to generate cash flow, maintain
an impressive growth rate and boost the value of EFCA stock. In some cases, legitimate
policies were reinsured for more than their face amount, while at other times totally ficti-
tious policies were created. To carry out this scheme, EFCA created supporting files,
medical records and death certificates for non-existent policy holders, bribed and intimi-
dated some of its auditors and state examiners, and falsified its financial records to show
the receipt and disposition of non-existent premiums. Secrist claimed that he had actually
witnessed the creation of fictitious files which were used to deceive EFCA's auditors. He
asserted that, as a result of such activities, many EFCA employees had left the company.
He estimated that, by 1972, EFCA carried at least 40,000 fictitious policies on its books,
representing at least one-third of EFCA's outstanding life insurance business.
Raymond L. Dirks, Exchange Act Release No. 34-17480, 1981 WL 36329, at *2 (Jan. 22, 1981)
(footnotes omitted).
228. Id. at* 1-2.
229. Id. at *2.
230. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 649.
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Equity Funding investments.23' As the SEC opinion chronicles, Dirks
had numerous conversations with these investors and even arranged con-
tacts between them and former employees of Equity Funding. Dirks also
opined that Equity Funding stock would soon stop trading and that the
stock should be sold.232 In return, Dirks received additional business; the
majority and minority took differing views as to the effect of this upon
Dirks's motivation.233
However, Dirks also contacted Equity Funding's auditors and the
Wall Street Journal, which, after following up on Dirks's information,
contacted the SEC and the SEC then called Dirks in.234 The majority
asserts then the Wall Street Journal declined to write the story,235 while
the dissent asserts that the Wall Street Journal investigated and informed
the SEC.236 The same day Dirks met with the SEC, March 27, 1973, the
New York Stock Exchange suspended trading because of the increased
trading volume and the precipitous drop in price from $26 per share to
$15.237 Also at this time, the California and Illinois Departments of In-
surance were investigating Equity Funding and were preparing to shut
down its operations.
238
2. The Divergent Views of the Majority and Minority
In view of the foregoing facts, consider the differing approaches of
the majority and minority. According to the majority, the SEC had "con-
cluded" in disciplining Dirks that: "Where 'tippees'-regardless of their
motivation or occupation-come into possession of material . . . 'infor-
mation that they know is confidential and know or should know came
from a corporate insider,' they must either publicly disclose that infor-
mation or refrain from trading.239
While the foregoing quotation is found in the SEC's opinion, it is
not the conclusion or holding of the SEC. Rather the SEC concluded:
231. Id.
232. Dirks, 1981 WL 36329, at *5.
233. The majority focused upon the SEC finding that Dirks "played an important role in bring-
ing [Equity Funding's] massive fraud to light," Dirks, 463 U.S. at 651-52 (alteration in original)
(internal quotation marks omitted), while the dissent focused upon the fact that Dirks and his firm
"gained both monetary rewards and enhanced reputations for 'looking after' their clients," id. at 669
n.4 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), by enabling them to "dump[] stock on unknowing purchasers." Id. at
671.
234. Id. at 670.
235. Id. at 649-50 (majority opinion).
236. Id. at 670 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
237. See id.
238. In 1983, I was Deputy Attorney General for Illinois, and Illinois insurance officials in-
formed me that they and the California officials were preparing a "raid" on the offices of Equity
Funding at the time the story broke.
239. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 651 (majority opinion) (quoting Raymond L. Dirks, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-17480, 1981 WL 36329, at *6 (Jan. 22, 1981)).
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In sum, Dirks [an analyst] came into possession of material, non-
public corporate information, from persons who he knew were insid-
ers, at a time when he knew that the information was confidential and
not then publicly available. He communicated that information to
those likely to trade before the information became generally availa-
ble. In committing these acts, Dirks acted with scienter. Accordingly,
we conclude that Dirks willfully aided and abetted violations by Bos-
ton, Dreyfus, TZP, M&N and Bristol of Section 17(a) of the Securi-
ties Act and Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule
10-5b thereunder.
240
There are two fundamental differences between the two "conclu-
sions." The SEC did not rely on "disclose or abstain," but rather found
Dirks liable as an aider and abettor because he disclosed confidential
information to persons who would sell before the information would be
publicly available. In this regard, the SEC opinion was a forerunner of
Rule 10b5-2(b)(2).241
Second, the SEC clearly focused upon scienter. This is a key ele-
ment in insider trading-one that provides the proper bounds to limit the
scope of persons who are subject to the insider trading proscriptions.
Dirks was a securities professional who knew the information was mate-
rial,242 knew the information was non-public, knew that it was given to
him in confidence to publicly disclose, and knew that his tippees would
sell before public disclosure.
243
The Court began its analysis of the issues raised by the SEC sanc-
tioning of Dirks by again referencing Cady, Roberts as a seminal case,
once again without realizing that the Cady, Roberts decision sanctioned a
securities professional who was tipped by an insider who did not "sin";
240. Dirks, 1981 WL 36329, at *9.
241. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2(b)(2) (2013) (promulgated in Selective Disclosure and Insider
Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 33-7881, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-43154, In-
vestment Company Act Release No. 24599, 73 SEC Docket 3 (proposed Aug. 15, 2000)).
242. As the SEC stated:
The inside information to which Dirks had become privy demonstrated, in the words of
one commentary, that "one of the darlings of Wall Street, a company that had managed to
produce continued high earnings growth for a decade, was, instead, a gigantic fraud."
Under the circumstances, it took little insight into the operations of the market-and
Dirks was, of course, a highly experienced and highly sophisticated analyst-to recog-
nize that anyone who held EFCA shares and became aware of the information in Dirks'
possession would have a strong incentive to sell before that knowledge became wide-
spread. Indeed, Dirks expressly advised at least one of those whom he tipped to sell, and
he observed that others did so, even without an explicit recommendation, based on his
revelations. Accordingly, we find that Dirks knew or should have known that his selec-
tive disclosure of the information he had gleaned from EFCA insiders would result in
trading.
Dirks, 1981 WL 36329, at *9 (footnotes omitted).
243. Parenthetically, this is one of the rare times that "disclose or abstain" made sense: Dirks
did have the option (if not the obligation) to disclose publicly the confidential information he had
received. Absent such a disclosure, he had the obligation to abstain.
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in other words, Cady, Roberts was in direct opposition to the approach
ultimately taken by the Court in Dirks.244
The Court, in Part II of the Dirks opinion, accepted the concept set
forth in Cady, Roberts that, for there to be a violation of Rule lob-5 in an
insider trading context, two elements must be met: "(i) the existence of a
relationship affording access to inside information intended to be availa-
ble only for a corporate purpose, and (ii) the unfairness of allowing a
corporate insider to take advantage of that information by trading without
disclosure.245
But, relying on Chiarella, the Court asserted that "'a duty to dis-
close under § 10(b) does not arise from the mere possession of nonpublic
market information.' Such a duty arises rather from the existence of a
fiduciary relationship.,
246
Again, Cady, Roberts rejected the argument that a duty under the
247securities laws derived from common law fiduciary concepts.
The Court concluded Part II of its opinion by affirming the Cady,
Roberts principle that "an insider will be liable under Rule lOb-5 for
inside trading only where he fails to disclose material nonpublic infor-
mation before trading on it and thus makes 'secret profits.'
248
At this point it is not clear where the Court is going. But the Court
then runs amuck in Part III, beginning its analysis by recognizing that a
"typical tippee" generally has no common law fiduciary relationship with
the corporation.249 The SEC had taken the position that a tippee who re-
ceives confidential non-public material information from an insider is
subject to the same constraints as the insider.250 Following Chiarella, the
Court rejected the proposition that "[anyone]-corporate insider or
not-who regularly receives material nonpublic information may not use
that information to trade in securities without incurring an affirmative
duty to disclose."251 However, it did acknowledge: "[t]he conclusion that
recipients of inside information do not invariably acquire a duty to dis-
244. Cady, Roberts & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 34-6668, 1961 WL 60638, at *2 (Nov.
8, 1961).
245. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 653-54 (1983) (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S.
222, 227 (1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
246. Id. at 654 (citation omitted).
247. As the SEC stated:
Whatever distinctions may have existed at common law based on the view that an officer
or director may stand in a fiduciary relationship to existing stockholders from whom he
purchases but not to members of the public to whom he sells, it is clearly not appropriate
to introduce these into the broader anti-fraud concepts embodied in the securities acts.
Cady, Roberts, 1961 WL 60638, at *5.
248. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 654 (quoting Cady, Roberts, 1961 WL 60638, at *6 n.3 1).
249. Id. at 655.
250. Id. at 655-56.
251. Id. at 656 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1365
(2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 445 U.S. 222 (1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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close or abstain does not mean that such tippees always are free to trade
on the information. The need for a ban on some tippee trading is
clear.
, 252
What is the "some tippee trading" that is forbidden? According to
the Court:
Thus, some tippees must assume an insider's duty to the share-
holders not because they receive inside information, but rather be-
cause it has been made available to them improperly. And for Rule
lOb-5 purposes, the insider's disclosure is improper only where it
would violate his Cady, Roberts duty. Thus, a tippee assumes a fidu-
ciary duty to the shareholders of a corporation not to trade on materi-
al nonpublic information only when the insider has breached his fi-
duciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing the information to the
tippee and the tippee knows or should know that there has been a
breach.
253
Besides inferring that insider trading liability is the exception rather
than the rule by repeated use of "some," the Court then waffled on when
an insider breaches his fiduciary duty of non-disclosure: "All disclosures
of confidential corporate information are not inconsistent with the duty
insiders owe to shareholders.254 Consequently, "the test is whether the
insider personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure.
Absent some personal gain, there has been no breach of duty to stock-
holders. And absent a breach by the insider, there is no derivative
breach., 255 Consequently, the tippee sins only if the tipper sins, and the
tipper sins only when he or she receives a benefit from the tippee.
As indicated above, the dissent had an entirely different view of
both the law and the facts. With respect to the facts, the dissent observed,
"In disclosing . . . [inside] information to Dirks, Secrist intended that
Dirks would disseminate the information to his clients, those clients
would unload their Equity Funding securities on the market, and the
price would fall precipitously, thereby triggering a reaction from the au-
thorities.'256
The dissent also focused upon the fact that Dirks was compensated
for "looking after" his clients257 and that his efforts to bring the fraud to
252. Id. at 659.
253. Id. at 660 (footnote omitted).
254. Id. at 661-62.
255. Id at 662.
256. Id. at 669 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissent also opined:
But this is precisely what Secrist did. Secrist used Dirks to disseminate information to
Dirks' clients, who in turn dumped stock on unknowing purchasers. Secrist thus intended
Dirks to injure the purchasers of Equity Funding securities to whom Secrist had a duty to
disclose. Accepting the Court's view of tippee liability, it appears that Dirks' knowledge
of this breach makes him liable as a participant in the breach after the fact.
Id. at 671 (footnote omitted).
257. Id. at 669 n.4 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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light were "feeble. 258 Dirks informed his clients before making any at-
tempt to contact the SEC. To the minority, Dirks was no hero who
brought to light a fraud, which otherwise might have gone undiscov-
ered,259 but, rather, a market professional who knew his actions would
injure most of the shareholders260 while enabling his clients to avoid a
major loss.
261
With respect to the law, the dissent, responding to the majority's
holding that Dirks was not liable because Secrist did not obtain any per-
sonal benefit and thus did not violate his duty to Equity Funding, stated
that "the Court imposes a new, subjective limitation on the scope of the
duty owed by insiders to shareholders. The novelty of this limitation is
reflected in the Court's lack of support for it." 262 The dissent asserted that
"[t]he fact that the insider himself does not benefit from the breach does
not eradicate the shareholder's injury. 263 According to the dissent, "[t]he
duty is addressed not to the insider's motives, but to his actions and their
consequences on the shareholder. Personal gain is not an element of the
breach of this duty."2 64 The scope of the duty is circumscribed by the
requirement of scienter.
3. The Failed Policy Chosen by the Majority in Dirks
Consider now the differing opinions from a policy standpoint. In
this case, there were two interests in conflict: those of the shareholders
and the investing public that bought from Dirks's tippees, on the one
hand, and those of analysts and others who wished to take advantage of
non-public information they had obtained, on the other hand. The pur-
pose of the securities laws in general is to insure "the maintenance of fair
and honest markets,265 and of § 10 in particular to support "the public
interest" and insure "the protection of investors.',2 66 Consequently, whose
interests should the Supreme Court consider paramount: (a) those of
Dirks and his tippees who saved millions of dollars by bailing out early
on the basis of material non-public information, or (b) those of (i) the
shareholders, who were unaware of Dirks's information and suffered the
precipitous drop in price, and (ii) the investors, who bought from the
258. Id at 670.
259. As stated earlier, state officials were in the process of shutting down Equity Funding's
scam. See supra note 238; Dirks, 463 U.S. at 668-69 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
260. Once disclosure is publicly made, all shareholders have a comparable opportunity to sell
as the price declines. As a result of Dirks's actions, the uninformed shareholders were not informed
until after the stocks had plummeted. Id. at 669-70.
261. Id. at 670.
262. Id at 671.
263. Id. at 673. The dissent added: "It makes no difference to the shareholder whether the
corporate insider gained or intended to gain personally from the transaction; the shareholder still has
lost because of the insider's misuse of nonpublic information." Id. at 674.
264. Id. at 674 (footnote omitted).
265. 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2012).
266. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012).
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
tippee institutions only to find that they owned stock in a defunct compa-
ny?
While the majority favored the analysts and institutions that wanted
to make a fast buck, the dissent championed the uninformed shareholders
and investors. For the majority, opportunists are favored over the invest-
ing public. This is a pattern that continued through the fourth trilogy in
267Central Bank, Stoneridge Investment Partners, and Janus Capital.
The majority in Dirks, as it continued its pattern of cutting back on
the scope of Rule lOb-5, was overly enamored of the importance of ana-
lysts to the functioning of the securities markets. The majority rejected
the SEC position that those receiving material, non-public information
from a corporate insider had a duty to disclose or abstain (more properly,
abstain until disclosed) on that basis that such an approach "could have
an inhibiting influence on the role of market analysts.268 According to
the majority:
It is commonplace for analysts to 'ferret out and analyze infor-
mation,' and this often is done by meeting with and questioning cor-
porate officers and others who are insiders. And information that the
analysts obtain normally may be the basis for judgments as to the
market worth of a corporation's securities. The analyst's judgment in
this respect is made available in market letters or otherwise to clients
of the firm.
269
The Court opined-erroneously as we will see ZV-that "[i]t is the
nature of this type of information, and indeed of the markets themselves,
that such information cannot be made simultaneously available to all of
the corporation's stockholders or the public generally.,271 While the ma-
jority recognized that Dirks's startling information "required no analy-
sis,,272 it opined that "the principle at issue here extends beyond these
facts."
2 73
In taking this position, the Court was not embodying a conservative
approach because the majority focused not upon the facts of the case
before it, but rather "legislated," as it did in Blue Chip Stamps,274 to solve
a problem not then presented to the Court. Moreover, the majority opin-
ion reflects a lack of understanding of the corporation's role in disclosing
material information and the analyst's role in uncovering information.
267. See infra Part IV.
268. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 658 (majority opinion).
269. Id. at 658-59 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
270. See infra text at notes 275-76.
271. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 659.
272. Id. at 658 n.18.
273. Id.
274. See supra text accompanying note 128-32.
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Contrary to the opinion, it is possible to disclose material infor-
mation in a public fashion. The SEC has adopted Regulation F-D,275
which requires that when a corporation or a person acting on its behalf
discloses material, non-public information, it shall simultaneously dis-
close such information to the public or, in the case of inadvertent disclo-
sure, as promptly as possible.276
With respect to the proper role of analysts, the SEC opinion in Dirks
should have provided insight to the Supreme Court as to what a legiti-
mate analyst actually does:
In this connection, it is important to recognize that this is not a
case in which a skilled analyst weaves together a series of publicly
available facts and non-material inside disclosures to form a "mosa-
ic" which is only material after the bits and pieces are assembled into
one picture. We have long recognized that an analyst may utilize
non-public, inside information which in itself is immaterial in order
to fill in "interstices in analysis." That process is legitimate even
though such "tidbits" of inside information "may assume heightened
significance when woven by the skilled analyst into the matrix of
knowledge obtained elsewhere," thereby creating material infor-
mation.
277
The SEC opinion, while recognizing the importance of an analyst's
work and the legitimacy of tracking down rumors, concluded that "the
analyst's role, like that of any other person, is constrained by the well-
established proscriptions of the antifraud provisions of the federal securi-
ties laws, and we cannot condone the unfairness inherent in the selective
dissemination of material, inside information prior to its public disclo-
sure."
278
Clearly the position of the SEC and the dissent is true to the purpos-
es of the securities laws, while the position of the majority undercuts the
protection of investors.
Subsequent events in the 2000s have brought into question the in-
tegrity of the analyst community and the quality of its analysis. Enron
was a highly-touted stock that also was the darling of the analysts until
Bethany McLean questioned its business model and earnings.27 9 Thereaf-
ter, Enron's scam was revealed and its stock became worthless.28 Later,
after the dot-com bubble burst, New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer
uncovered a flood of recommendations by analysts touting stocks for the
275. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2013).
276. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(a) (2013).
277. Raymond L. Dirks, Exchange Act Release No. 34-17480, 1981 WL 36329, at *7 (Jan. 22,
1981) (footnote omitted).
278. Id. at *10.
279. Bethany McLean, Is Enron Overpriced?, FORTUNE, Mar. 5, 2001, available at
http://money.cnn.com/2006/01 /  3/news/companies/enronoriginal fortune/.
280. In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
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public to buy that they were at the same time disparaging as "crap" to
their colleagues.28' Their motivation frequently was to obtain underwrit-
ing commitments for the investment banking side of their firm. 282 Some-
times the motivation was merely to get a daughter into nursery school.283
The Court should no longer be overly solicitous about holding analysts to
account.
4. The Problem of Tone, the Explosion of Insider Trading, and the
Congressional Response
In the course of the Dirks opinion, the Court asserted:
1. "[O]nly some persons, under some circumstances, will be barred
from trading while in possession of material nonpublic infor-
mation."
284
2. "Judge Wright correctly read our opinion in Chiarella as repudiat-
ing any notion that all traders must enjoy equal information before
trading."
'285
3. "[T]he disclose-or-refrain duty is extraordinary."
286
4. "[A] duty [to disclose] arises ... not merely from one's ability to
acquire information because of his position in the market."
287
5. "All disclosures of confidential corporate information are not in-
consistent with the duty insiders owe to shareholders."
288
6. "Absent some personal gain, there has been no breach of duty to
stockholders."
2 89
281. See Christopher Lucas, Note, The Triangle Shirtwaist Fire and the Merrill Lynch Analyst
Ratings Scandal: Legislative and Prosecutorial Responses to Corporate Malfeasance, I BROOK. J.
CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 449,463-64 (2007) (Spitzer found emails describing stock as "a POS [piece
of shit]" from an analyst that publicly described that same stock as "an attractive investment" (altera-
tion in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Joseph Nocera & Abrahm Lustgarten, Wall
Street on the Run, FORTUNE, June 14, 2004, available at
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortunearchive/2004/06/14/372633/ (explaining the set-
tlements reached between the New York attorney general and Wall Street investment banks after
Spitzer learned of analysts' routine betrayal of investors); Complaint $ 86, SEC v. Blodget, No. 03
Civ.2947(WHP), 2004 WL 435059 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2004), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/compl8115b.htm (explaining that the public research
reports by analysts were inconsistent with the analysts' privately expressed negative views).
282. See Pat Huddleston 11 et al., Protect Investors from Brokers' Stock Scams, TRIAL, Apr.
2003, at 38 (explaining that analysts recommended stocks in order to secure investment-banking
business, with no regard for the true financial conditions of the corporations).
283. Gretchen Morgenson & Patrick McGeehan, Wall St. and the Nursery School: A New York
Story, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2002, at A1.
284. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 657 (1983).
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 657-58 (second alteration in original).
288. ld. at 661-62.
289. Id at 662.
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7. "Chiarella made it explicitly clear there is no general duty to forgo
market transactions 'based on material, nonpublic information."-
29
8. "In one sense, as market values fluctuate and investors act on inev-
itably incomplete or incorrect information, there always are winners
and losers; but those who have 'lost' have not necessarily been de-
frauded."
'291
These observations created a tone that arguably contributed to a
rash of insider trading that followed the Chiarella and Dirks decisions in
the 1980s. A Wall Street Journal reporter in Den of Thieves extensively
chronicled the upsurge in insider trading.292 Correlation does not mean
causation but pronouncements uch as those made by the Supreme Court
could well have led to disdain by many in the investment banking com-
munity toward any proscription against insider trading. There is no ques-
tion that insider trading increased markedly in the 1980s. In 1984, a
Congressional Report opined that "[i]nsider trading has become a more
widespread problem in recent years," and the SEC "has brought more
such cases during the past four years than in all previous years com-
bined.,293 The Report also opined that "if the Dirks decision is properly
and narrowly construed by the courts, the Commission's insider trading
program will not be adversely affected.,
294
In response to the surge of insider trading, Congress twice took ac-
tion in an attempt to curtail this activity: in 1984, with the Insider Trad-
ing Sanctions Act,295 and in 1988, with the Insider Trading and Securities
296Fraud Enforcement Act. The 1984 Act incorporated a potential treble
damage liability for those who engaged in insider trading.297 Decisions
by the circuit courts first had looked askance at the "draconian" liability
when damages were measured, not by the benefit to the guilty party but
by the loss suffered by all investors who traded contemporaneously,
298
and then limited recovery to the benefits obtained by a defendant who
illegally traded.299 The problem with merely requiring the defendant to
290. Id. at 666 n.27 (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 233 (1980)).
291. Id.
292. See generally JAMES B. STEWART, DEN OF THIEVES (1991).
293. H.R. REP. NO. 98-355, at 5 (1983).
294. Id. at 15.
295. Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264.
296. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102
Stat. 4677.
297. Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 § 2(A).
298. In Fridrich v. Bradford, one insider's profit was $13,000 but was subjected by the district
court to a judgment of $361,186.75. 542 F.2d 307, 308 (6th Cir. 1976). In reversing the lower court,
the Sixth Circuit characterized this as "Draconian liability." Id. at 309 (internal quotation marks
omitted). The concurring opinion suggested that liability only attach to those plaintiffs who traded
"contemporaneously" with the insider. Id. at 327 (Celebrezze, J., concurring). The 1988 Act adopted
this approach. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 § 3(b). Fridrich also
questions whether an insider who did not abstain "caused" the party on the other side of the transac-
tion to trade. Fridrich, 542 F.2d at 323.
299. Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 173 (2d Cir. 1980).
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disgorge his or her profits is that there is no downside (other than a po-
tential criminal sanction) to engaging in insider trading. If you do not get
caught, you win; if you do get caught, you merely return your ill-gotten
gain. To put additional teeth into insider trading enforcement, the SEC
requested, and Congress conferred, the treble damage penalty provision.
Notwithstanding this new enforcement tool, in 1988 another Con-
gressional Report asserted that "the last few years have seen a dramatic
increase in insider trading cases, including cases against some of the
most prominent officials in Wall Street investment banking firms."
300
Accordingly, Congress enacted the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud
Enforcement Act of 1988. This act expanded the civil penalty provision
to include broker-dealers, investment advisors and others who failed to
take appropriate steps to prevent insider trading by incorporating the
prior penalty provisions into a new § 21A of the 1934 Act. 3°1 Because the
logic of the Fridrich v. Bardford decision302 had effectively undercut the
causation aspect of private insider trading litigation, Congress resuscitat-
ed this cause of action by providing for insider liability to contempora-
neous traders.3 °3 But as damages were limited by the insiders benefit,
there has been little incentive to utilize this provision unless the insider's
gain was very substantial.
C. Carpenter: The Uncertain Status of the Misappropriation Theory
Carpenter v. United States304 was another case involving unusual
facts. David Carpenter, a roommate of R. Foster Winans, was a bit player
in a fraud concocted by Winans and Peter Brandt, a distinguished broker
with Kidder Peabody.30 5 Winans wrote an influential column, "Heard on
the Street," for the Wall Street Journal. In his column, Winans applauded
certain stocks and downplayed others. Stocks frequently rose after a
positive column and fell after a negative one. Winans tipped Brandt as to
the publication date and nature of the column and Brandt would buy be-
fore a positive column and go short before a negative one .3 6 After the
column was published and the stock moved, Brandt would close out the
transaction. Over a four-month period, the scheme netted almost
$700,000.307
300. H.R. REP. No. 100-910, at 11 (1988).
301. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 § 21A.
302. Fridrich, 542 F.2d at 318-20, 323.
303. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 § 20A.
304. 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
305. Kenneth Felis, another participant in scheme, was also a broker at Kidder Peabody. Id. at
20-22.
306. The story of the scheme is detailed in Winans's book. R. FOSTER WINANS, TRADING
SECRETS: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT OF THE SCANDAL AT THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (1986). From
reading the book, one could glean that the purpose was to punish Peter Brandt, an unscrupulous
social climber, who was the chief prosecution witness against Winans and the other defendants. See
Broker in Winans Case Is Sentenced, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 27, 1988, at 137.
307. Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 23.
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In 1987, the decision of the Supreme Court in the pending case of
Carpenter was eagerly awaited.308 There were some who argued that
insider trading was a "victimless crime," that it moved the stock market
in the "correct" direction, that prohibiting it was bad policy,309 and that it
was an appropriate way to compensate entrepreneurs and corporate man-
agement.310 On the other hand, there was hope that the Supreme Court
would affirm the misappropriation theory that Justice Burger had articu-
lated in his dissent in Chiarella.31 1 The decision turned out to be anticli-
mactic, however, since the Court affirmed the convictions under Rule
lOb-5 due to the Court splitting 4:4 on this issue.31 2 The 4:4 split was
occasioned by the difficulty some Justices had in accepting that the fraud
against the Wall Street Journal, namely misappropriating its printing
schedule to "time" the trading, was "in connection with" a securities
transaction.
It was not until ten years later that the Court upheld the misappro-
priation theory under Rule 1Ob-5 and affirmed the conviction of an attor-
ney in a law firm that represented the bidder in a potential takeover.3 13
The attorney had purchased stock and call options of the target company
based upon his knowledge of the pending transaction. When the stock
rose dramatically after the tender offer was announced, the attorney
made more than $4.3 million.
314
In United States v. O'Hagan, Justice Scalia dissented on the basis
that § 10(b) requires the "manipulation or deception of a party to a secu-
rities transaction,"315 while Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, dissented on the basis that the majority opinion and the SEC
308. See, e.g., Stuart Taylor, Jr., Winans Case Taken by Justices, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1986, at
D1; James B. Stewart, Death of a Theory? Supreme Court May Revamp Insider-Trading Law, WALL
ST, J., Sept. 30, 1987.
309. Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading and Property Rights in New Information, 4 CATO J.
933, 935-37 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted). For a later view of this thinking, see Donald
J. Boudreaux, Learning to Love Insider Trading, WALL ST. J., Oct. 24, 2009, at W1.
310. I offered to debate Professor Manne on this point at his Law and Economics program at
Dartmouth College. He declined. To rebut his position, consider Diamond v. Oreamuno, where two
entrepreneurs, knowing that earnings would drop sharply because of a sharp increase in costs, sold
56,000 shares at $28; the market dropped to $11 when the adverse earnings were announced. 248
N.E.2d 910, 911 (1969). Is this appropriate compensation?
Nor is insider trading victimless. The conceptual problem is that the injury is to the same
side of the market. The person on the other side of the transaction actually benefits because, if buy-
ing, the sale by the insider drops the price, whereas, if selling, the purchase by the insider raises the
price. But the person on the same side as the insider is always "late to the party." In Oreamuno, the
insider got out at $28, whereas the public could only sell at $11. If disclosure were first made, the
insider would need to compete with other sellers to get out as the market began to plunge. It is likely
that an exchange would stop trading until the market digested the news and all would then have
equal opportunity at the new price.
311. See supra Part III.A.
312. The Court unanimously affirmed the convictions under the mail and wire fraud statute.
Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 24.
313. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 642-44 (1997).
314. Id.
315. Id. at 679 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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failed "to provide a coherent and consistent interpretation" of the "in
connection with" requirement.316 In particular, they found inconsistent
the position that a misappropriation of information would give rise to a
Rule lOb-5 action, but a misappropriation of money would not.317 The
distinction drawn by the majority was that the fraud regarding infor-
mation occurs when the information is wrongfully used, whereas the
fraud in misappropriating money occurs at the time of embezzlement,
irrespective of whether the money is later used to purchase securities.
31
8
There is another weakness in the misappropriation theory that was
recognized by the Second Circuit in Carpenter. Because Winans's fraud
was converting the information of his employer as to printing schedules,
the court observed that "the Wall Street Journal or its parent, Dow Jones
Company, might perhaps lawfully disregard its own confidentiality poli-
cy by trading in the stock of companies to be discussed in forthcoming
articles."'31 9 But the court felt assured that "a reputable newspaper, even
if it could lawfully do so, would be unlikely to undermine its own valued
asset, its reputation, which it surely would do by trading on the basis of
its knowledge of forthcoming publications.320
That this would even be an issue illustrates the absurdity of relying
upon a common law duty to a person or entity that is not a party to a se-
curities transaction to bring a lawsuit based upon, or "in connection
with," a securities transaction. This in turn illustrates the absurdity in
Chiarella of requiring a common law duty to the person on the other side
of the transaction in order to establish deceit. How much more sensible
would the law have been if Chiarella had truly followed Cady, Roberts
and rejected reliance on common law principles, reframed "disclose or
abstain" to "abstain until disclosable," and recognized that market pro-
fessionals have such a duty when they knowingly [scienter] trade on ma-
terial, non-public information?
The cases in this third trilogy reflect a reactionary approach by the
Supreme Court. The policy of the securities laws was given lip-service,
but basically ignored. A well-reasoned decision, such as Cady, Roberts,
was cited to support the Court's decision when, in fact, it was diametri-
cally opposed to the rationale in both Chiarella and Dirks. The Court
took the inept phrasing in Texas Gulf Sulfur-"disclose or abstain"-and
constrained its application by appending to it a common law duty re-
quirement. A flood of insider trading ensued. As stated above, while cor-
relation is not necessarily causation, the tone of the Court's decision, and
316. Id. at 680 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
317. Id. at 683-84 (quoting the Government's argument at oral hearing).
318. Id. at 655-57 (majority opinion).
319. United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1026, 1033 (2d Cir. 1986).
320. Id. at 1033.
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the roadblocks to insider trading enforcement hat it created, certainly did
nothing to inhibit the explosion of insider trading.
IV. THE FOURTH TRILOGY: INSULATING COLLATERAL PARTICIPANTS
FROM LIABILITY
The last trilogy of Supreme Court cases dealing with the liability of
collateral participants is unique in that fourteen years passed between the
first and second decision; however, the second and third quickly fol-
lowed each other. The Supreme Court saw its most recent decision, Ja-
nus Capital Group, Inc., as a necessary outcome if its decision in Central
Bank of Denver, NA.3 2 1 was not to be undermined.322 The Court in Ston-
eridge Investment Partners took essentially the same tack.323 Because
Central Bank is both significant in its own right, as well as essentially
determinative of the subsequent wo cases, it is important to understand
the shaky foundation upon which it sits.
A. Central Bank: The Demise ofAiding and Abetting
The primary violator in Central Bank was a real estate development
company that issued bonds in 1986 and planned a new issue in 1988.324
The bond indenture required that the bonds be secured by real estate val-
ued at 160% of the debentures.325 Central Bank was the indenture trustee
under both the existing and proposed bond offerings.3 26 Early in 1988,
Central Bank secured a supposedly updated appraisal from the develop-
ment's appraiser.327 The values were essentially unchanged from two
years earlier, notwithstanding a drop in real estate prices in the Colorado
Springs area and a number of foreclosures.328 The underwriter under the
1986 offering wrote to Central Bank, informed the Bank that the under-
writer believed that the appraisal was inflated and that the indenture cov-
enants were violated, and requested that Central Bank commission a new
appraisal by an independent appraiser, as it had the authority to do under
321. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164
(1994).
322. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivatives Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2302 (2011). The
Court in Janus Capital was unaware of the fact that after its decision in Central Bank, the Enron
disaster and other massive corporate corruption cases ensued, followed by a major financial collapse,
triggered in substantial part by the fraudulent creation and marketing of innovative financial securi-
ties. See Charles W. Murdock, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act:
What Caused the Financial Crisis and Will Dodd-Frank Prevent Future Crises?, 64 SMU L. REV.
1243 (2011). While correlation is not necessarily causation, Central Bank, by eliminating aiding and
abetting liability, arguably turned professionals, such as attorneys, who should be gatekeepers into
hired guns. See infra notes 432-44 and accompanying text.
323. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 162-63 (2008).
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the indenture.3 29 The Bank asked its own appraiser to examine the ap-
praisal, and he also thought the appraisal was inflated. The Bank then
met with the developer and agreed to postpone the new appraisal until
after the 1988 offering. The new offering went forward and shortly
thereafter the development company defaulted.33u
The primary violation was the misrepresentations about the value of
the real estate by the development company. Central Bank was charged
with aiding and abetting 331and the litigation revolved around the second
element of aiding and abetting: Central Bank argued that it had no duty
under the indenture to get a new appraisal and that, absent such a duty,
recklessness was insufficient; without a duty, actual knowledge of the
332primary fraud was necessary. The Supreme Court went beyond this
argument, however, and determined that aiding and abetting liability did
not exist in a Rule lob-5 action.333
1. Reactionary Judicial Decision Making
At the outset, it is paradoxical, as well as disingenuous, for a sup-
posedly conservative court to engage in reactionary judicial activism. But
that is exactly what the Court in Central Bank did. First, the issue decid-
ed by the Court was not the one litigated in the courts below, nor was it
the issue raised by the parties on appeal. The issue below, and which the
parties raised on appeal, dealt with the defendant's knowledge of, or
recklessness in not knowing, the primary violation.334 The parties never
questioned the existence of a cause of action for aiding and abetting.
Nevertheless, on its own motion, the Court directed the parties to brief
this issue.
The next aspect of reactionary judicial activism was that all eleven
circuits had accepted aiding and abetting liability. 335 When there is a split
329. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A. v. Pring, 969 F.2d 891, 894 (10th Cir. 1992), rev'd
sub nom. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
330. Id. at 895.
331. Justice Stevens, in his dissent, set forth the elements of aiding and abetting liability:
The Courts of Appeals have usually applied a familiar three-part test for aider and abet-
tor liability, patterned on the Restatement of Torts formulation, that requires (i) the exist-
ence of a primary violation of § 10(b) or Rule 10b-5, (ii) the defendant's knowledge of
(or recklessness as to) that primary violation, and (iii) "substantial assistance" of the vio-
lation by the defendant.
Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 194 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
332. Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 175-76 (majority opinion).
333. Id. at 177.
334. Id. at 190. The Grant of Certiorari limited review to Question 2 presented by the petition
and directed the parties to brief and argue the following additional question: "[W]hether there is an
implied private right of action for aiding and abetting violations of Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule lOb-5." Scott M. Murray, Comment, Central Bank of Denver
v. First Interstate Bank of Denver: The Supreme Court Chops a Bough from the Judicial Oak: There
Is No Implied Private Remedy to Sue for Aiding and Abetting Under Section 1O(b) and SEC Rule
lOb-5, 30 NEW ENG. L. REv. 475, 505 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted).
335. See, e.g., Farlow v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 956 F.2d 982, 986 (10th Cir. 1992); K
& S P'ship v. Cont'l Bank, N.A., 952 F.2d 971, 977 (8th Cir. 1991); Levine v. Diamanthuset, Inc.,
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among the circuits, the Supreme Court often resolves it. But aiding and
abetting liability was well-settled law. As Justice Stevens pointed out in
his dissent:
In hundreds of judicial and administrative proceedings in every
Circuit in the federal system, the courts and the SEC have concluded
that aiders and abettors are subject to liability under § 10(b) and Rule
I0b-5 .... While we have reserved decision on the legitimacy of the
theory in two cases that did not present it, all 11 Courts of Appeals to
have considered the question have recognized a private cause of ac-
tion against aiders and abettors under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.
336
Central Bank did not resolve unsettled law but rather unsettled very
resolved law. While the majority stated that it "granted certiorari to re-
solve the continuing confusion over the existence ... of the § 10(b) aid-
ing and abetting action[,]" the only confusion as to its existence was in
the mind of the majority. 
337
The Court in the Stoneridge Investment Partners decision sought to
justify its decision by asserting "[t]his is not a case in which Congress
has enacted a regulatory statute and then has accepted, over a long period
of time, broad judicial authority to define substantive standards of con-
duct and liability." 338 But that was exactly what had occurred prior to
Central Bank with respect to aiding and abetting liability. Section 10(b)
was enacted in 1934, Rule lob-5 was promulgated in 1942, and a private
cause of action recognized in 1946, shortly after World War II ended.339
Aiding and abetting liability in Rule lob-5 actions was recognized at
least as early as 1963, 34 and the Supreme Court first considered Rule
lOb-5 in 1969.34' Congress substantially revised the 1934 Act in 1964342
950 F.2d 1478, 1483 (9th Cir. 1991); Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485, 496-97 (4th Cir. 1991);
Fine v. Am. Solar King Corp., 919 F.2d 290, 300 (5th Cir. 1990); Schneberger v. Wheeler, 859 F.2d
1477, 1480 (11th Cir. 1988); Moore v. Fenex, Inc., 809 F.2d 297, 303 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied
sub norn. Moore v. Frost, 483 U.S. 1006, 107 S. Ct. 3231 (1987); Cleary v. Perfectune, Inc., 700
F.2d 774, 777 (1 st Cir. 1983); IT, An Int'l Inv. Trust v. Comfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 922 (2d Cir. 1980);
Monsen v. Consol. Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793, 799 (3d Cir. 1978). The only court not to have
squarely recognized aiding and abetting in private § 10(b) actions has done so in an action brought
by the SEC, see Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824, 844-45 (D.C. Cir. 1982), revd on other grounds, 463
U.S. 646 (1983), and has suggested that such a claim was available in private actions. See Zoelsch v.
Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 35-36 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The Seventh Circuit's test differs
markedly from the other circuits' in that it requires that the aider and abettor "commit one of the
'manipulative or deceptive' acts prohibited under section 10(b) and rule l0b-5." Robin v. Arthur
Young & Co., 915 F.2d 1120, 1123 (7th Cir. 1990).
336. Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 192 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
337. Id. at 170 (majority opinion).
338. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 163 (2008).
339. See supra Part I.A.
340. See, e.g., Burley & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 34-3838, 23 SEC Docket 461 (Aug. 5,
1946).
341. See SEC v. Nat'l Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 455 (1969).
342. Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, 78 Stat. 565. These amend-
ments expanded the reach of disclosure requirements under the 1934 Act, by making the registration,
periodic reporting, proxy, and insider trading provisions applicable to large over-the-counter compa-
nies in addition to listed companies which were previously covered by the Act. The amendments
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and again in 1975,343 well aware of aiding and abetting liability in Rule
lOb-5 actions. The doctrine itself has been recognized for a century,
344
and was formulated in the Restatement of Torts in 1939.
345
2. The Flawed Analysis
Judicial activism could be accepted if it made sense from a policy
standpoint or if it were supported by sound judicial reasoning. Central
Bank met neither criterion. From a policy standpoint, the law should dis-
courage wrongdoing, not insulate it from accountability. From a juris-
prudential perspective, the Central Bank opinion was so outcome deter-
minative that it discredited the Court's objectivity.
The Court began its analysis by recognizing that "Congress did not
create a private § 10(b) cause of action and had no occasion to provide
guidance about the elements of a private liability scheme. ' 346 However,
with respect to the type of conduct prohibited, the statutory language
controls. According to the Supreme Court, because the statutory lan-
guage controls, this "bodes ill" for the existence of aiding and abetting
liability as "Section 10(b) does not in terms mention aiding and abet-
ting. '347 This is absurd reasoning. The Court acknowledged that the pri-
vate cause of action was judicially created and thus Congress provided
no guidance about its elements. Why then would any rational person
expect Congress to deal with whether a remedy it did not create would be
complemented by aiding and abetting liability for those who assist a pri-
mary violator?
Viewed from a different perspective, the argument can be made that
Congress did anticipate aiding and abetting liability under § 10. This
section, by its terms, defines "unlawful" activity, and unlawful activity
can be prosecuted criminally by the U.S. Attorney. The Crimes and
Criminal Procedure section of the U.S. Code specifically provides:
"Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets,
also imposed increased standards and disciplinary controls for broker-dealers in securities. For a
thorough analysis of the 1964 Amendments, see Richard M. Phillips & Morgan Shipman, An Analy-
sis of the Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, 1964 DUKE L.J. 706 (1964).
343. Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97. These amendments
further expanded the reach of the SEC to oversee self-regulatory organizations and develop a nation-
al system for clearance and settlement of securities transactions. They also expanded the reporting
requirements of large financial institutions and generally sought o eliminate obstacles to competi-
tion within the securities industry. For a thorough analysis of the 1975 Amendments, see John G.
Gillis, Securities Law and Regulation: Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, 31 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 12
(1975).
344. THOMAS MCINTYRE COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS: OR THE WRONGS
WHICH ARISE INDEPENDENTLY OF CONTRACT 244 (3d ed. 1906).
345. 4 RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF TORTS: PERSONS ACTING IN CONCERT § 876(b) (1939).
346. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 173
(1994).
347. Id. at 175 (internal quotation mark omitted).
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counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable
as a principal. 348
There is also further statutory language that suggests that aiding and
abetting liability does not affront the statutory scheme: Section 10(b)
forbids conduct that "directly or indirectly" is "manipulative or decep-
tive., 34 9 The Court rebuts this argument by asserting that "federal courts
have not relied on [this language] when imposing aiding and abetting
liability., 350 This is because all federal courts prior to Central Bank did
not find it necessary to construe the statute with regard to aiding and
abetting liability as they were dealing with a judicially created cause of
action. But, if the statute is viewed with an open mind, rather than an
outcome-determinative mindset, there is little basis for rejecting the
cause of action.
The Court then asserts that Congress knew how to create aiding and
abetting liability. Congress also knows how to pass a budget-or at least
it did.351 But Congress's knowledge of neither is relevant to a judicially
created cause of action. The Court then concluded its analysis of the stat-
ute by asserting that the Court could not amend the statute by "creat[ing]
liability for acts that are not themselves manipulative or deceptive."352 In
so doing, the Court fails to understand the difference between primary
and secondary liability. It is the primary violator who engages in manipu-
lative or deceptive conduct. The aider and abettor is secondarily liable
because the person assists the primary violator. An essential element of
aiding and abetting liability is that there must be a primary violation that
would encompass manipulative or deceptive conduct.
3. Distinction Between Express Negligence Causes of Action and
an Implied Cause of Action Requiring Recklessness
After it completed its nonsensical examination of the statute to de-
termine whether Congress provided for aiding and abetting liability with
regard to a judicially created cause of action, the Court then fantasized
whether, had Congress created a private cause of action, it would have
provided for aiding and abetting. The Court examined the private causes
of action that Congress expressly created and noted that none of them
provided for aiding and abetting liability. The Court accordingly con-
cluded that "[t]here is no reason to think that Congress would have at-
348. 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (2012).
349. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012).
350. Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 176.
351. See Len Burman, Budget Brinkmanship in Congress Must End, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR
(Dec. 18, 2011), http://www.csmonitor.com/Business/Tax-VOX/2011/1218/Budget-brinkmanship-
in-Congress-must-end (explaining that Congress consistently followed a successful budget process
beginning in 1974, but that in five of the past twelve years, Congress has not passed a budget resolu-
tion at all, instead relying on emergency measures and last-minute stop-gaps).
352. Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 177-78.
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tached aiding and abetting liability only to § 10(b) and not to any of the
express private rights of action in the Act.,
353
Unfortunately for the Court, there is a very significant reason to dis-
tinguish between § 10(b) and the express private rights in the 1933 and
1934 securities acts-a reason the Court itself created almost twenty
years earlier. In Ernst & Ernst, the Court determined that the language of
§ 10(b) precluded a private action under Rule lOb-5 from sounding in
negligence, thereby requiring scienter354-today recklessness.35 5 As the
Court itself recognized, aiding and abetting liability originated in crimi-
nal law,356 and its extension to negligence cases is of relatively recent
origin.357 Since the express private causes of action sound in negligence,
it is not surprising that Congress did not attach aiding and abetting liabil-
ity. But, in the express private causes "of action, Congress did cast a broad
net in terms of liability. For example, § 11 of the 1933 Act imposes lia-
bility, not only upon the issuer, but also upon officers, directors, invest-
ment bankers, and experts named in the registration statement.358 In other
circumstances, some of these named defendants could be considered
aiders and abettors.
One of the private actions listed by the Court was § 9 of the 1934
Act.359 Because liability is imposed on those who "willfully participate"
in the proscribed manipulation, this is not a negligence provision. But it
also does not negate a policy accepting aiding and abetting liability.
While § 10 imposes liability upon those who "use or employ" manipula-
tive or deceptive acts, § 9 imposes liability upon one who "willfully par-
ticipates" in manipulation. The conduct of the suppliers in Stoneridge
Investment Partners, who conspired with the issuer to inflate its earnings,
was challenged on the basis that they directly and willfully participated
in the fraud.360 Section 9, by its terms, covers "willful" participants. Yet,
on the basis of Central Bank, such liability was rejected even though the
1934 Act clearly does not reflect a policy against liability for willful par-
ticipants.
The Supreme Court, in Central Bank, also made short shrift of the
argument that the 1984 and 1988 legislative reports approved of aiding
and abetting liability under Rule lOb-5.36t While the Court characterizes
353. Id. at 180.
354. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 185 (1976).
355. Id at 193 n.12 ("In this opinion the term 'scienter' refers to a mental state embracing
intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud. In certain areas of the law recklessness is considered to be
a form of intentional conduct for purposes of imposing liability for some act.").
356. Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 181.
357. See id. at 181-82.
358. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2012).
359. Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 178.
360. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 148 (2008).
361. Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 185 (citing H.R. REP. No. 100-910, at 27 n.23 (1988)) (noting that
a certain provision did "not affect the availability of any other theories of liability, such as aiding and
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the Committee reports as making "oblique references" to aiding and
abetting,362 the references are hardly oblique. For example, the 1984 Re-
port stated: "The committee endorses the judicial application of the con-
cept of aiding and abetting liability to achieve the remedial purposes of
the securities laws.
3 63
The Court also states that "the interpretation given by one Congress
(or a committee ... thereof) to an earlier statute is of little assistance in
discerning the meaning of that statute.' ' 364 But, paradoxically, this is in
effect what the Supreme Court itself has been doing. In the late 1970s,
the Court began restricting the circumstances in which a private cause of
action would be implied.365 It then uses its recent antipathy toward pri-
vate courses of action to restrict causes of action developed under an
earlier Supreme Court regime in which the law at that time favored the
implication of a remedy.
In Central Bank, the Court downplayed the fact that Congress had
amended the securities laws many times without rejecting the judicial
doctrine of aiding and abetting. But, previously with respect to Rule 1Ob-
5, the Supreme Court had stated that "[t]he longstanding acceptance by
the courts, coupled with Congress' failure to reject Birnbaum 's reasona-
ble interpretation ... argues significantly in favor of acceptance of the
Birnbaum rule by this Court.' '366 Now, let us rewrite the prior sentence,
substituting "aiding and abetting" for "Birnbaum": "The longstanding
acceptance by the courts, coupled with Congress' failure to reject [aiding
and abetting], argues significantly in favor of [aiding and abetting liabil-
ity]." Or let us take the same tack to the Court's language in Herman &
MacLean, substituting aiding and abetting for "Section 10(b)":
In 1975[,] Congress enacted the "most substantial and significant re-
vision of this country's Federal securities laws since the passage of
the Securities Exchange Act in 1934." When Congress acted, federal
courts had consistently and routinely permitted a plaintiff to proceed
[under aiding and abetting]. In light of this well-established judicial
interpretation, Congress' decision to leave [aiding and abetting] in-
tact suggests that Congress ratified [aiding and abetting liability].
36 7
abetting"). "Current law generally imposed secondary liability on persons who aid and abet the
inside trader." H.R. REP. No. 98-355, at 10 (1983).
362. Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 185.
363. H.R. REP. No. 98-355 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274, 2283.
364. Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 185 (internal quotation mark omitted).
365. See Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d 216 (6th Cir. 1980),
affd, 456 U.S. 353 (1982); Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 677-78 (1979); Touche Ross &
Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 560 (1979); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 186 (1976);
Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 67 (1975).
366. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 733 (1975).
367. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 384-86 (1983) (footnotes omitted)
(citation omitted).
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Apparently, the guiding principle for this Court is "[a] foolish con-
sistency is the hobgoblin of little minds."368 The opinion is an exemplar
of justification, not thoughtful and objective analysis. As will be devel-
oped in the balance of this Article, if there is a guiding principle for the
Court in these cases, it is protecting wrongdoers at the expense of the
public investor.
B. Stoneridge: Direct Participant Liability
1. The Contrast Between Central Bank and Stoneridge
The facts in Stoneridge bore no relation to those in Central Bank.
Central Bank was a classic case of aiding and abetting. The elements of
aiding and abetting traditionally have been (i) a primary violation, (ii)
knowledge of the primary violation or recklessness in not being aware of
the primary violation by the secondary actor, and (iii) substantial assis-
tance to the primary violator by the secondary actor.369
In contrast to Stoneridge, as discussed earlier, the primary violator
in Central Bank was a real estate development that had issued bonds in
1986 and planned a new issue in 1988, while Central Bank was the in-
denture trustee under both the existing and proposed bond offerings. The
primary violation was the misrepresentations about the value of the real
estate by the development company. Central Bank was charged with
aiding and abetting, and it was with this issue that the Court dealt.
While it would be naive to say that Central Bank did not benefit
from deferring the appraisal and letting the second offering go forward-
it had both a stake in the fees from acting as trustee under the second
offering and a stake in keeping a client happy to secure business in the
future-it clearly was not a direct participant in the primary violator's
fraud. Nonetheless, had it fulfilled its responsibilities and promptly ob-
tained a new appraisal, the fraud on the investors probably would not
have occurred.370
Although it would be hard to label Central Bank as a crook, that is
exactly what the defendants in Stoneridge were. And the Supreme Court
was hardly unaware of the situation. It set out the facts as follows:
For purposes of this proceeding, we take these facts, alleged by pe-
titioner, to be true. Charter, a cable operator, engaged in a variety of
fraudulent practices so its quarterly reports would meet Wall Street
expectations for cable subscriber growth and operating cash flow.
The fraud included misclassification of its customer base; delayed
reporting of terminated customers; improper capitalization of costs
368. RALPH WALDO EMERSON, Self-Reliance, in ESSAYS (FIRST SERIES) 19 (Infomotions, Inc.
2001).
369. See supra note 331.
370. The Supreme Court apparently does not understand that it is engaging in risk allocation.
[Vol. 91:2
2014] JANUS CAPITAL GROUP AND RULE JOB-5 ACTIONS 423
that should have been shown as expenses; and manipulation of the
company's billing cutoff dates to inflate reported revenues. In late
2000, Charter executives realized that, despite these fforts, the com-
pany would miss projected operating cash flow numbers by $15 to
$20 million. To help meet the shortfall, Charter decided to alter its
existing arrangements with respondents, Scientific-Atlanta and
Motorola.
Respondents supplied Charter with the digital cable converter (set
top) boxes that Charter furnished to its customers. Charter arranged
to overpay respondents $20 for each set top box it purchased until the
end of the year, with the understanding that respondents would return
the overpayment by purchasing advertising from Charter. The trans-
actions, it is alleged, had no economic substance; but, because Char-
ter would then record the advertising purchases as revenue and capi-
talize its purchase of the set top boxes, in violation of generally ac-
cepting accounting principles, the transactions would enable Charter
to fool its auditor into approving a financial statement showing it met
projected revenue and operating cash flow numbers. Respondents
agreed to the arrangement.
So that Arthur Andersen would not discover the link between
Charter's increased payments for the boxes and the advertising pur-
chases, the companies drafted documents to make it appear the trans-
actions were unrelated and conducted in the ordinary course of busi-
371ness.
2. The Arguments for and Against Direct Liability
Thus, Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola jointly conspired with Char-
ter to engage in a series of transactions for the purpose of inflating earn-
ings and thereby inflating the price of Charter's stock. Scientific-Atlantic
and Motorola directly benefitted from the arrangement through increased
revenues and profits, and their direct participation in the fraud was essen-
tial to carrying out the fraud. With respect to the fraud, they were argua-
bly primary violators, not secondary violators. The secondary characteri-
zation comes into play only because the purpose of the fraud was to in-
flate Charter's earnings and it was Charter that "made" the misrepresen-
tation to the investing public about its earnings.
Yet, the Court in Stoneridge blithely took the position that its deci-
sion was controlled by Central Bank and arguably extended it, stating:
"[t]he conduct of a secondary actor must satisfy each of the elements ...
for liability,"372 including reliance.373 However, while the Court suppos-
edly followed Central Bank, in which it had examined the express pri-
371. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 153-54 (2008).
372. Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 158.
373. Id. at 159.
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vate causes of action to discern congressional intent, an examination of
the express liability provisions does not establish, or even support, the
argument that the liability of secondary actors must meet all of the ele-
ments of liability for primary actors. The express liability provisions in
the 1933 and 1934 Acts are complemented by liability imposed upon
controlling persons who, in effect, are secondary actors. Section 15 of the
1933 Act provides:
Every person who, by or through stock ownership, agency, or other-
wise, or who, pursuant to or in connection with an agreement or un-
derstanding with one or more other persons by or through stock own-
ership, agency, or otherwise, controls any person liable under sec-
tions 77k or 771 of this title, shall also be liable jointly and severally
with and to the same extent as such controlled person to any person
to whom such controlled person is liable, unless the controlling per-
son had no knowledge of or reasonable ground to believe in the ex-
istence of the facts by reason of which the liability of the controlled
person is alleged to exist.
374
Section 20(a) of the 1933 Act provides:
Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable
under any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation there-
under shall also be liable jointly and severally with and to the same
extent as such controlled person to any person to whom such con-
trolled person is liable ... unless the controlling person acted in good
faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constitut-
ing the violation or cause of action.
375
In none of these statutory secondary liability provisions is there any
indication that, in order to hold the controlling person liable, a plaintiff
must prove the same elements of a cause of action against the person
secondarily liable as it does against the primary violator. Rather, Con-
gress provided the direct opposite: plaintiff first must prove the cause of
action against the primary violator and then the unique elements regard-
ing the secondary violator's responsibility come into play.
3. Contorting Fact to Fit Bias
From a standpoint of common sense, the opinion goes downhill
from this point. Let us briefly go back to the facts. The defendants exe-
cuted documents and engaged in transactions with the issuer, Charter
Communications, the sole purpose of which was to inflate Charter's
earnings-which was exactly what was accomplished.
With respect to this fraud, the Court made the following statements:
374. 15 U.S.C. § 77o (2012).
375. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (2012).
[Vol. 91:2
2014] JANUS CAPITAL GROUP AND RULE JOB-5 ACTIONS 425
(i)"[Respondents'] deceptive acts were not communicated to the pub-
lic"; 376
(ii) "No member of the investing public had knowledge, either ac-
tual or presumed, of respondents' deceptive acts... ";377
(iii) There is no authority for a rule "that in an efficient market in-
vestors rely not only upon the public statements relating to a security
but also upon the transactions those statements reflect."
' 378
(iv) Petitioner seeks to apply § 10(b) beyond the securities mar-
kets-"to purchase and supply contracts-the realm of ordinary
business operations";
379
(v) "§ 10(b) ... does not reach all commercial transactions that are
fraudulent and affect the price of a security in some attenuated
way.
, 380
(vi) "Here respondents were acting in concert with Charter in the
ordinary course as suppliers and, as matters then evolved in the not
so ordinary course, as customers";
381
(vii) "Unconventional as the arrangement was, it took place in the
marketplace for goods and services, not in the investment sphere."
382
(viii) "Charter was free to do as it chose in preparing its books" [i.e. it
was not compelled by respondents to cook its books].
383
The foregoing characterizations make little sense. First of all, the
stock market is driven by earnings. Missing an earnings projection by a
penny a share can send a stock plummeting.384 To say that an investor
relies on the earnings but not the transactions that underlie such earnings
is sophistry. The reported earnings have no relevance absent the integrity
of the underlying transactions. In WorldCom, for example, the earnings
were fraudulent because cash outflows that should have been expensed
were capitalized.3 85 That was analogous to the fraud in the case at bar.
Investors rely upon earnings as a surrogate for the integrity of the under-
376. Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 159.
377. Id.
378. Id. at 160.
379. Id. at 161.
380. Id. at 162 (emphasis added).
381. Id. at 166 (emphasis added).
382. Id.
383. Id.
384. See, e.g., Oracle Profit, Revenue Miss Expectations; Shares Drop, CNBC.COM (Dec. 20,
2011, 5:39 PM ET), http://www.cnbc.com/id/45736368 (Oracle reported its quarterly earnings were
54 cents per share, up from 51 cents per share for the previous year, but this was 3 cents per share
lower than analysts expected, causing its stock to fall 14.6%).
385. See Peter Elstrom, How to Hide $3.8 Billion in Expenses, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK
MAG., July 7, 2002, available at
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/02 27/b3790022.htm.
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lying transactions. It is the financial health of the company, and its ability
to generate a stream of cash flow in the future, that determines stock
price.386 Thus, as stated above, the reported earnings are a surrogate for
the underlying health of the company. When the underlying transactions
are fraudulent, the earnings based upon such transactions misinform the
market about the underlying health of the company.
Moreover, this fraud did not affect the price of Charter stock in
some attenuated way. As the Supreme Court expressly stated:
Charter, a cable operator, engaged in a variety of fraudulent practices
so its quarterly reports would meet Wall Street expectations for cable
subscriber growth and operating cash flow.... Charter executives
realized that, despite these efforts, the company would miss projected
operating cash flow numbers by $15 to $20 million. To help meet the
shortfall, Charter decided to alter its existing arrangements with re-
spondents, Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola.
387
Rather than affecting the price of Charter stock in some attenuated way,
the whole purpose of the fraud was to affect the price of the stock.
Finally, this fraud did not occur in the realm of ordinary business
operations, the defendants were not acting in the ordinary course as sup-
pliers, and the transactions did not take place in the marketplace for
goods and services. Rather, the fraud was the antithesis of ordinary busi-
ness operations. In ordinary business operations, buyers do not pay dou-
ble the market price for goods and advertisers do not buy advertisements
they do not want. These transactions were not in the marketplace for
goods and services; they were outside the marketplace and involved pri-
vately orchestrated corruption.
For the Supreme Court to classify the present fraud as an ordinary
commercial transaction is beyond naive; the Court is consciously strain-
ing to present unconscionable activity as merely commercial. It is a little
like Humpty-Dumpty in Through the Looking Glass: Words mean exact-
ly what I mean them to mean; neither more nor less.
388
C. Janus Capital: Who "Makes" a Misrepresentation
Just when you think Supreme Court jurisprudence cannot become
any more detached from reality, the Court proceeds to outdo itself. A
386. Discounted cash flow is a norm for valuing a corporation. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457
A.2d 701, 712 (Del. 1983). The process involves projecting cash flows for a number of years in the
future and then taking the present value of such cash flows in order to obtain the present value of the
corporation. See CHARLES W. MURDOCK, The Earnings Value of a Business, in 8 ILLINOIS PRACTICE
SERIES: BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 19.3 (2d ed. 2013).
387. Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 153.
388. LEwIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS, AND WHAT ALICE FOUND THERE 66
(Selwyn H. Goodacre ed., Univ. of Cal. Press 1983) (1871).
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straight reading of Janus Capital Group v. First Derivative Traders
389
suggests that the Court has eliminated management liability for securities
fraud except for those members of management who sit on the board of
directors. After Janus Capital, the new model for corporate governance
could be a board composed only of one inside director, the CEO, and the
balance of the board composed of outsiders who, if they are sufficiently
uninformed, can escape liability for securities fraud. The rest of man-
agement need not worry.390 And the CEO need not worry if he did not
expressly authorize the misrepresentation. Rather than encouraging an
informed board, the decision does the converse. Rather than encouraging
accountability, it discourages accountability.
1. The Facts
Janus Capital involved a mutual fund, Janus Investment Fund (the
Fund), that stated in its prospectuses that it had taken steps to curb mar-
ket timing,39' when in fact it had not. Janus Capital Group (Janus Capital)
is a publicly traded asset management company that created the Fund as
a separate legal entity owned by the Fund's shareholders.392 Janus Capi-
tal Management LLC (Management) is a wholly owned entity controlled
by Janus Capital, which was engaged by the Fund to be its investment
advisor.
393
The investment advisory services provided by Management includ-
ed "management and administrative services necessary for the operation
389. 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011).
390. It is too early to predict with assurance how Janus Capital will play out. See infra text
accompanying notes 413-20.
391. See, e.g., Gary D. Halbert, The Hedge Fund/Mutual Fund Scandal, PROFUTURES INV.,
http://www.profutures.com/article.php/206/ (last visited Apr. 22, 2014). Halbert described the mar-
ket timing scandal as follows:
Canary [Capital Partners LLC] (and perhaps other large hedge funds) allegedly obtained
special trading opportunities with several leading mutual fund families-reportedly in-
cluding Bank of America's Nations Funds, Banc One, Janus and Strong-by promising
to make substantial investments in various mutual funds offered by these firms.
The special trading opportunities, in this case fraudulent trading opportunities, consisted
primarily of so-called "late trading" of mutual funds after the stock markets close at 4:00
eastern time. If you or I, for example, want o make a purchase or sale of a mutual fund,
we have to get our orders in to the fund family before the close of the markets, sometimes
30 minutes or more before the markets close. If you or I place our order after the markets
close at 4:00 today, then we don't get that order filled until tomorrow at the 4:00 closing
price.
In the case of Canary, the mutual funds noted above (and possibly others) allegedly al-
lowed Canary (and others) to place its orders AFTER the markets closed and still get the
closing price for the same day. As you know, there are frequently announcements just af-
ter the markets close that can have significant effects on the markets the following day.
Allegedly, these hedge funds would trade on this after-market information and reap big
profits the following day.
Allowing large hedge funds to trade after hours is illegal and it serves to reduce profits
and/or increase losses to the other shareholders of the mutual funds!
Id.
392. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2299.
393. Id.
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of [the Fund]., 394 All the officers of the Fund were officers of Manage-
ment; one member of the Fund's board of directors was associated with
Management.
395
Plaintiffs alleged that Janus Capital and Management caused the
Fund to issue prospectuses that created a misleading impression that Ja-
nus Capital and Management would implement measures to curb market
timing in the Fund.3 96 The district court dismissed the complaint, but the
Fourth Circuit reversed on the basis that "JCG [Janus Capital] and JCM
[Management], by participating in the writing and dissemination of the
prospectuses, made the misleading statements contained in the docu-
ments."397 With respect to reliance, the Fourth Circuit also determined
that investors would infer that Management "played a role in preparing
or approving the content of the Janus fund prospectuses," but would not
infer the same about Janus Capital, "which could be liable only as a 'con-
trol person.' ,,
398
To this, the Supreme Court simply responded that, to be liable,
"JCM [Management] must have 'made' the material misstatements in the
prospectuses. We hold that it did not."
399
2. The Flawed Analysis of the Majority
The policy perspective from which the majority began its analysis is
(i) contrary to the philosophy that formerly covered interpretation of the
securities laws, namely, "to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for
the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard of
business ethics in the securities industry," and to construe legislation
enacted to avoid fraudulent activity "not technically and restrictively, but
flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes" ;4° (ii) contrary to Congres-
sional policy in enacting the 1934 Act "to insure the maintenance of fair
and honest markets";40 and (iii) contrary to the policy of § 10 of that Act
402to further the public interest and to protect investors. According to the
majority, "[c]oncems with the judicial creation of a private cause of ac-
tion caution against its expansion," and thus the Court must give "narrow
dimensions" to a private cause of action under Rule 1Ob-5.4 °3 It should be
394. Id. (internal quotation mark omitted).
395. Id. The opinion pointed out that the Fund's board was more independent han required by
the securities laws: "[U]p to 60 percent of the board of a mutual fund may be composed of 'interest-
ed persons."' Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(a) (2006)).
396. Id. at 2300.
397. Id. at 2301 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566
F.3d I 11, 121 (4th Cir. 2009), rev'd, Janus, 131 S. Ct. 2296).
398. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d at
127-30).
399. Id.
400. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186, 195 (1963).
401. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2012).
402. 15 U.S.C. § 78i.
403. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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noted that the "concerns" about a private cause of action are those of the
Supreme Court, not of Congress.41 4
After engaging in some wordsmithing, the majority determined that
"the maker of a statement is the person or entity with ultimate authority
over the statement, including its content and whether and how to com-
municate it."' 405 According to the Court, "[a] broader reading of
'make' . . would substantially undermine Central Bank" because, "[i]f
persons or entities without control over the content of a statement could
be considered primary violators who 'made' the statement, then aiders
and abettors would be almost nonexistent.
' 406
The problem with this statement of the Court is that it is dead
wrong, as indicated by the cases it was seeking to preserve and felt com-
pelled to follow and protect. Central Bank4 7 dealt with an aider and
abettor bank that failed to follow up on information that the land, which
secured the debentures of which it was a trustee and which was the sub-
ject of a forthcoming offering, was substantially overvalued. On the other
hand, Stoneridge4 8 dealt with businesses that conspired with the issuer to
manipulate the prices each charged the other in order to inflate the issu-
er's earnings. In Central Bank, there was no assertion that the aiders and
abettors made any statement. On the other hand, in Stoneridge, while the
defendants were not charged with directly making a statement, they were
charged with knowingly participating in transactions which they knew
would lead to an earnings statement that misled investors.
In the case at bar, the majority rejected the idea that Management
could have "made" the statement in the Fund's prospectus. The Court
asserted that only the person with ultimate authority can "make" a state-
ment and that attribution is strong evidence as to who is the maker.409 In
so doing, the majority used the analogy of a speechwriter and a speak-
er. While the speechwriter may draft a speech, it is the speaker who is
responsible for the content.
But in this case, respondent's analogy may be more apt: that of a
playwright and the actor.411 While the actor speaks, it is the playwright
who is responsible for the statements.
404. Courts first recognized a private cause of action in 1946. See supra text accompanying
note 12. Until Central Bank, all eleven circuit courts of appeals had expressly recognized this private
cause of action and understood that it included aiding and abetting liability. See supra text accompa-
nying note 334. Congress amended the securities laws several times in the interim and never once
mentioned any concerns about the application of the private right of action.
405. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302.
406. Id.
407. See supra text accompanying note 324-33.
408. See supra text accompanying note 367-69.
409. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302.
410. Id.
411. Id at 2304.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W RE VIE W
The majority emphasized that the Fund had an independent board of
directors.41 2 Thus, the board would be responsible for the misstatements
in the prospectuses. But the Fund does not have its own employees.413
The Fund's board is dependent upon Management for information and
advice. As is well known: She who controls the information, controls the
decision.414 But this reality is beyond the ken of the majority. It con-
cludes that, even though Management "was significantly involved in
preparing the prospectuses," since Management was "subject to the ulti-
mate control of' the Fund, the Fund, and not Management, made the
statements in the prospectuses,415 even though the board may not have
had any knowledge that the statements in the prospectus were false and
misleading.
This stance by the majority is even more irrational since the false
statements related to a matter-namely, whether market timing had been
stopped-which was totally in the control of Management, which drafted
the prospectuses. You can rest assured that Management did not tell the
board of the Fund that it continued to permit market timing, and that it
would also be asserting the contrary in the prospectuses. The Court also
relied upon the Stoneridge holding that the public could not have relied
upon the actions of Motorola and Scientific-Atlanta in conspiring with
Charter Communications to inflate the latter's sales, which thus inflated
Charter Communications's earnings and stock price, because it was not
"inevitable" that the company would use the increased sales to increase
its earnings.416 At the risk of wordsmithing like the majority, it depends
upon what the word "inevitable" means. Of course, it is possible that
Charter Communications's management might have had a conversion
experience, realized the evil of inflating earnings, and reversed the inflat-
ed sales data. But is not the likelihood of a conversion experience by
management so remote that any rational person would conclude that the
pattern of inflated sales would "inevitably" be incorporated into the fi-
412. Id
413. See supra Part IV.C. I ("The Facts") and text accompanying notes 390-98.
414. This conclusion is based upon my experience as an expert in mutual fund litigation. Basi-
cally, the board does what the manager ecommends. Portions of my opinion were quoted extensive-
ly by the Eighth Circuit in reversing the district court in Gallus v. Ameriprise Financial, Inc. (the
American Express mutual fund advisor). 561 F.3d 816, 819 (8th Cir. 2009), vacated, 559 U.S. 1046
(2010). This experience is confirmed by the administrative proceedings in connection with the Janus
Group market timing. See Lammert, Exchange Act Release No. ID-348, 2008 WL 6593436 (ALJ
Apr. 28, 2008), where the administrative law judge stated:
The existence of approved market timing relationships was widely known no later than
the completion of the Beery Report, which was circulated to dozens of Janus employees
and executives. This knowledge was never shared with the Board. In the presentation to
the Board on the use of redemption fees on market timing the legal department relied
heavily on the Beery Report in the preparation of materials for the presentation, Howev-
er, the final materials provided to the Board did not include any mention of the approved
market timing relationships.
Id
415. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2305.
416. Id. at 2303 (internal quotation mark omitted),
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nancial statements? As indicated above, the thinking process of the ma-
jority is either outcome determinative or Alice in Wonderland. To sug-
gest that management would orchestrate an elaborate series of fraudulent
transactions, but then not "inevitably" incorporate them into the public
financial statements, is again irrational.
Yet, the majority uses this twisted logic from Stoneridge to support
its reasoning in Janus Capital that only the person with ultimate control
over the statement and its communication can "make" a statement, be-
cause "[w]ithout such authority, it is not 'necessary or inevitable' that
any falsehood will be contained in the statement.', 41 7 Again, refer back to
the prior discussion. It was in the best interest of Janus Capital not to
disclose that it had not terminated market timing. Janus Capital, through
Management, controlled the drafting of the prospectus. Would any ra-
tional person expect Janus Capital to either disclose in the prospectuses
that it had continued this illegal activity, or to disclose to the board of
directors that it was denying the continuation of this activity in the pro-
spectuses, even though it had not been terminated? The board and thus
the Fund were at the mercy of Management. Clearly the statements were
"made" by Management. But, since Management did not make the
statement, according to the Court, it is not liable, nor is its control per-
son, Janus Capital. And the board of directors is not liable because they
lacked scienter as to the misleading nature of the prospectuses.
Once again, the Supreme Court provides a safe harbor for fraudu-
lent activity. Moreover, as discussed below, it has choreographed the
perfect crime.
The dissent took the majority to task, not only for the Court's un-
warranted reliance upon Central Bank and Stoneridge,418 but also, and
more importantly, for its unnecessary wordsmithing with regard to the
scope of the word "make." The dissent asserted:
But where can the majority find legal support for the rule that it
enunciates? The English language does not impose upon the word
"make" boundaries of the kind the majority finds determinative. Eve-
ry day, hosts of corporate officials make statements with content that
more senior officials or the board of directors have "ultimate authori-
ty" to control.4 19
Whether this will be the case in the future is discussed below.
3. The Consequences of the Court's Decision
Arguably, the Supreme Court has written the script for the perfect
crime. According to the administrative law judge in the disciplinary pro-
417. Id.
418. Id. at 2307-08 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
419. Id. at 2307.
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ceedings with respect to market timing by Janus Group, the board of
directors was not informed of the market timing activities.420 If only the
board of directors is deemed to make the statement because of its ulti-
mate authority, and if the board is unaware of the truth, then there is no
primary violation, which would also mean that, even in an SEC proceed-
ing, there could be no aiding and abetting liability because of the lack of
a primary violation.
Under the law prior to Janus Capital, as the dissent pointed out:
[B]oth language and case law indicate that, depending upon the cir-
cumstances, a management company, a board of trustees, individual
company officers, or others, separately or together, might "make"
statements contained in a firm's prospectus-even if a board of direc-
tors has ultimate content-related responsibility.
42 1
Additionally, the Supreme Court in 1983, in the process of determining
that an express private cause of action under the 1933 Act did not ex-
clude an implied cause of action under Rule 1Ob-5, stated:
Moreover, certain individuals who play a part in preparing the reg-
istration statement generally cannot be reached by a Section 11 ac-
tion. These include corporate officers other than those specified in 15
U.S.C. § 77k(a), lawyers not acting as "experts, " and accountants
.... If, as Herman & MacLean argues purchasers in registered offer-
ings were required to rely solely on Section 11, they would have no
recourse against such individuals even if the excluded parties en-
gaged in fraudulent conduct while participating in the registration
statement. The exempted individuals would be immune from federal
liability for fraudulent conduct even though Section 10(b) extends to
"any person" who engages in fraud in connection with a purchase or
sale of securities.
422
Thus, it is clear that, in 1983, the Supreme Court envisioned that some-
one who participated in the drafting of a document could be liable under
Rule 1Ob-5.
The Supreme Court's approach in Janus Capital would also seem to
make its warning in Central Bank that "[a]ny person or entity, including
a lawyer, accountant, or bank, who employs a manipulative device or
makes a material misstatement (or omission) on which a purchaser or
seller of securities relies may be liable as a primary violator under Rule
10b--5, ''23 illusory. Arguably, Central Bank, by eliminating aiding and
abetting liability, reduced the likelihood that attorneys would act as gate-
420. See Lammert opinion cited supra note 414. "However, the final materials provided to the
Board did not include any mention of the approved market timing relationships." Id.
421. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2306 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
422. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 386 n.22 (1983) (emphasis added).
423. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 191
(1994).
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keepers in preventing their clients from making fraudulent representa-
tions.
In the wake of Janus Capital, one circuit court has employed the
Janus Capital "only the person with ultimate authority can make a
statement" test to insulate a corporation called during a conference call
from liability for statements made during the call.424 In Fulton County
Employees Retirement System v. MGIC Investment Corp.,425 MGIC
owned 46% of the equity of Credit-Based Asset Servicing and Securiti-
zation LLC (C-BASS), Radian Group Inc. owned another 46%, and the
managers at C-BASS owned the remaining 8%.426 Thus, C-BASS was
essentially a joint venture between MGIC and Radian Group. C-BASS
securitized sub-prime mortgages before the financial crisis destroyed its
business.427 As the sub-prime mortgage market began to falter in the
summer of 2007, C-BASS's lenders increasingly began making margin
calls, creating potential liquidity problems.428 One of the issues in the
case was a conference call held by MGIC on July 19, 2007. According to
plaintiffs, Williams, the CEO of C-BASS, and Draghi, its COO, made
false or misleading statements.
The Seventh Circuit held that MGIC could not be liable under
§ 20(a) as a control entity because Radian also had 46% ownership.
42 9
Consequently, according to the court, MGIC did not have control.430
With no liability under that section, the plaintiffs other recourse was
under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. However, because the two officers of C-
BASS, Williams and Draghi, made the statements during the C-BASS
conference call, MGIC could not be held liable under Rule lOb-5 be-
cause, under Janus Capital, only the person with ultimate control can be
the maker of a statement and MGIC did not have control.431 Moreover,
the Seventh Circuit upheld the district court's analysis rejecting the
432claims against Williams and Draghi. The district court had opined that,
even though much of the remaining money that the managers pointed to
when stating that C-BASS had substantial liquidity had already been
subject to margin calls before the conference call, this information "may
not have made its way up corporate channels" by the time of the call.433
424. See generally Fulton Cnty. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. MGIC Inv. Corp., 675 F.3d 1047, 1048-52
(7th Cir. 2012).
425. 675 F.3d 1047 (7th Cir. 2012).
426. Id. at 1048.
427. Id. at 1048-49.
428. Id. at 1049.
429. Id. at 1051.
430. Id. The Seventh Circuit noted that this type of investment structure is very common in
joint ventures. Id. With § 20(a) liability precluded in all of these types of cases, the impact of Janus
can be far-reaching.
431. Id.
432. Id. at 1052.
433. Fulton Cnty. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. MGIC Inv. Corp., No. 08-C-0458, 2010 WL 601364, at
"17 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 18, 2010), afid, 675 F.3d 1047 (7th Cir. 2012).
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Without personal knowledge of the extent of these margin calls, Wil-
liams and Draghi could not have had the requisite scienter to be liable
under Rule lOb-5. 434 This fantasy by the district court was possible be-
cause, under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA),
43 5
plaintiffs must meet a severe pleading burden when met with a motion to
dismiss without the benefit of discovery.436
Janus Capital may have limited impact with regard to statements
made by corporate management, in light of the Supreme Court's own
language and the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.437 Justice Thom-
as accepted that "attribution within a statement or implicit from sur-
rounding circumstances is strong evidence that a statement was made
by-and only by-the party to whom it is attributed.,438 And, pursuant to
section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,439 the CEO and CFO must sign
and certify in each annual and quarterly report that they have reviewed
the report, that to their knowledge it does not contain any material untrue
statement or omission of a material fact, that the financial statement pre-
sents fairly the financial condition of the company and the results of its
operations, that they are responsible for and have designed such internal
controls as necessary to ensure the material information is made known
to them, that they have evaluated the effectiveness of such internal con-
trols, and that they have reported any significant deficiencies to the com-
pany's auditors and audit committee. 44°
Accordingly, several district courts have recognized that officials
who make public statements cannot defend on the basis that they did not
have the ultimate authority, but rather that it resided in the board of di-
rectors.441 However, other courts have recognized this defense.42 In any
434. Id.
435. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (2012)).
436. Id. § 101. It is unfathomable that, with the subprime mortgage market collapsing, and with
C-BASS in the first six months of the year having been subject to $290 million of margin calls, that
the CEO and COO would not be aware of the fact that another $145 million of margin calls had been
made between July 1 and July 19, the date of the conference call. The district court, in effect, indulg-
es in a presumption that management is incompetent to save management from liability.
437. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
438. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2302 (2011).
439. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 302.
440. See 17 C.FR. § 240.13a-14 (2013); 17 C.F.R. § 229.601 tbl. Instruction (31) (2013).
441. See In re Merck & Co., MDL No. 1658 (SRC), 2011 WL 3444199, at *24-25 (D.N.J.
Aug. 8,2011). In In re Merck, plaintiffs alleged that Merck overstated the commercial viability of its
top-selling drug Vioxx. Id. at * 1. Several of the individual defendants, all officers of Merck, raised
defenses based on Janus, arguing that the statements attributed to them cannot lead to liability be-
cause the defendants did not have "ultimate authority over the statement[s]." Id. at *24 (quoting
Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302) (intemal quotation marks omitted). The district court used agency con-
cepts to differentiate, arguing that Management in Janus was a separate entity from the Fund, mean-
ing it was not an agent of the Fund. Id. at *25. In In re Merck, the officers were agents of Merck. Id.
Because corporations can only act through agents, it would be unreasonable to absolve corporate
officers of primary liability for all lOb-5 claims just because the statements they make are ultimately
within control of the corporation that employs them. See id.; see also Monk v. Johnson & Johnson,
No. 10-4841 (FLW), 2011 WL 6339824, at *17 n.19 (D.N.J. Dec. 19, 2011) (defendants raised
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event, the confusion caused by Janus Capital has added to the cost and
inefficiency of litigation by creating another issue that needs to be dealt
with by litigants and the courts.
Other courts have suggested that the Janus Capital limitation is ap-
plicable only to third parties who now cannot be liable for statements
made by their clients."3 Unfortunately, even if Janus Capital were so
limited, it would undercut the effectiveness of the securities laws in hold-
ing gatekeepers accountable. The idea that a lawyer, in drafting docu-
ments in connection with a securities transaction, can be held liable as a
primary violator for co-authoring or co-creating the document was first
developed in Klein v. Boyd,444 a case that was later settled on appeal and
the opinion withdrawn. This was further developed in In re Enron Corp.
Securities, Derivative, and ERISA Litigation."5
Consider the massive fraud perpetrated at the turn-of-the-century by
Enron, assisted by its attorneys. In litigation arising out of Enron's mas-
sive fraud, plaintiffs sued two law firms, Vinson & Elkins and Kirkland
claims almost identical to those in In re Merck, and the district court used the same analysis from In
re Merck to refute them); SEC v. Brown, 878 F. Supp. 2d 109, 116 (D.D.C. 2012).
442. In Hawaii Ironworkers Annuity Trust Fund v. Cole, No. 3:10CV371, 2011 WL 3862206
(N.D. Ohio Sept. 1, 2011), the court stated that there was nothing in Janus that would limit its hold-
ing "to legally separate entities." Id. at *3. The court concluded that "[t]he complaint does not state a
claim for primary liability under Janus, because the defendants[, former officers of the company,]
did not have ultimate authority over the content of the statement." Id. at *5.
443. City of Pontiac Gen. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 875 F. Supp. 2d 359, 374
(S.D.N.Y. 2012).
As for Janus Capital, that case addressed only whether third parties can be held liable
for statements made by their clients. Its logic rested on the distinction between secondary
liability and primary liability and has no bearing on how corporate officers who work to-
gether in the same entity can be held jointly responsible on a theory of primary liability.
It is not inconsistent with Janus Capital to presume that multiple people in a single cor-
poration have the joint authority to "make" an SEC filing, such that a misstatement has
more than one "maker."
Id. (citations omitted).
444. 949 F. Supp. 280, 284 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff'd, Nos. 97-1143, 97-1261 (3d Cir. Mar. 9,
1998), 1998 WL 55245, rehg en banc granted, vacated.
445. In re Enron Corp. Sec., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 586 (S.D. Tex. 2002). In re Enron Corp.
summarized Klein as follows:
[I]n Klein v. Boyd, a panel of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals [found that the law firm
in the dispute could be liable as a primary violator of securities fraud even though the at-
torney did not sign the documents and was never known to the investor as a participant in
the documents' creation. The appellate court concluded] that once the law firm "elected
to speak" by creating or participating in the creation of [the] documents ... it could not
make material misrepresentations or omit material facts in drafting the non-confidential
documents[, such as opinion letters]. The law firm's duty did "not arise from a fiduciary
duty to the investors; rather, the duty arose when the law firm undertook the affirmative
act of communicating with investors .... Thus the Third Circuit panel concluded that
although the firm may not have a duty to blow the whistle on its client, once it chooses to
speak, a law firm does have a duty to speak truthfully, to make accurate or correct mate-
rial statements, [even though the document may not be facially attributed to the lawyer].
The panel did require that the lawyer's "participation in the statement containing a mis-
representation or omission of a material fact [be] sufficiently significant that the state-
ment can properly be attributed to the person as its author or co-author," so that it would
not fall within the parameter of conduct constituting aiding and abetting.
Id at 602 (last alteration in original) (citations omitted).
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& Ellis, in connection with their participation with the fraud. 46 Vinson &
Elkins was the general counsel for Enron and not only represented it in
structuring illicit partnerships and special purpose entities for the purpose
of inflating Enron's earnings, but also drafted numerous disclosure doc-
uments, including registration statements and SEC filings, 447 which in-
corporated misrepresentations about the nature and purpose of these enti-
ties and their effect upon Enron's earnings. According to the court, the
law firm effected the "deceptive devices and contrivances that were the
heart of the alleged Ponzi scheme.'448 Vinson & Elkins' "voluntary, es-
sential, material, and deep involvement' 4 9 made it a primary violator in
Enron's fraudulent scheme. Moreover, "Vinson & Elkins was not merely
a drafter, but essentially a co-author of the documents it created for pub-
lic consumption concealing its own and other participants' actions.
450
The court determined that the law firm "deliberately or with severe reck-
lessness" put these misrepresentations in the public domain in order to
"influence those investors to purchase more securities, credit agencies to
keep Enron's credit high, and banks to continue providing loans to keep
the Ponzi scheme afloat. Therefore Vinson & Elkins had a duty to be
accurate and truthful.4 51
According to the court, this was not a situation where Vinson &
Elkins "merely" violated its professional principles and ethics. On the
other hand, the court determined that this was the case for Kirkland &
Ellis since, while "Kirkland & Ellis represented some of the illicit Enron-
controlled, non-public SPEs and partnerships that Enron ... used ... to
446. Id. at 563-64.
447. See, e.g., id at 660-61.
Disclosures in the following SEC filings, drafted and approved by Vinson & Elkins,
concealed material facts about the JEDI/Chewco, LJM, and/or Raptor transactions:
A. Quarterly Reports (on Form 10-Q) filed on: 8/16/99; 11/15/99; 5/15/00; 8/14/00;
11/14/00; 5/15/01; and 8/14/01.
B. Annual Reports (on Form 10-K) filed on 3/31/98; 3/31/99; 3/30/00; and 4/02/01.
C. Annual Proxies filed on: 3/30/99; 5/02/00; 5/01/01.
D. Report on Form 8-K, filed 2/28/01.
Furthermore, Enron related-party disclosures from Enron's previous Report on Form
10 -K and Report on Form I0-Q were incorporated by reference into the following Reg-
istration Statements and Prospectuses for Enron securities offerings: the resale of zero
coupon convertible senior notes, due 2021, filed 7/25/01; 7.875% notes due 6/15/03, filed
6/2/00; 8.375% notes due 5/23/05, filed 5/19/00; 7% exchangeable notes due 7/31/02,
filed 8/11/99; 7.375% notes due 5/15/2019, filed 5/20/99; common stock, filed 2/12/99;
6.95% notes due 7/15/2028, filed 11/30/98; and floating notes due 3/30/00, filed 9/28/98.
The disclosures consistently misrepresented that terms of Enron's transactions with relat-
ed third parties were representative of terms that could have been obtained from inde-
pendent third parties. Both Sherron Watkins' letter and the Powers' Report concluded
that the transactions were not arm's length, lacked true economic import, and were such
that no independent hird party would have accepted.
Id.
448. Id. at 704.
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hide its debt and record sham profits,' '452 it never made any misstate-
ments or misrepresentations to the public. While it also breached profes-
sional ethical standards, its conduct was not actionable under Rule 1 Ob-5.
The difference in approach between the Texas District Court and
the U.S. Supreme Court is striking. The conduct of the investment advi-
sor in Janus Capital was even more pervasive than the conduct of
Vinson & Elkins. The investment advisor had complete practical control
over the misrepresentations and hid their true nature from the directors of
the mutual fund. The district court's focus was, appropriately, on the
existence of wrongdoing and whether this wrongdoing was directed to
the investing public. The fact that the client had "the final authority to
control the contents of the registration statement"453 was irrelevant in
view of the deep involvement of the law firm in the preparation of the
registration statement and the law firm's knowledge of the true state of
affairs. The focus of the Supreme Court was on a hypertechnical defini-
tion of "make," which it utilized to ensure that wrongdoing would go
unpunished. The effect of the district court's decision was to send a sober
warning to gatekeepers that they are not hired guns, but have a responsi-
bility to the public. The effect of the Supreme Court decision is to create
a "what, me worry" attitude in attorneys and other gatekeepers.
Cases such as the foregoing, which required that a lawyer be a
counselor and not just a hired gun, are now eviscerated by the Supreme
Court's decision in Janus Capital.
CONCLUSION
The evolution of Supreme Court jurisprudence over the past forty
years reflects a sea of change in judicial philosophy. At the start of the
1970s, the liberal trend characterized by the Warren Court still prevailed.
An implied private cause of action was still in favor and litigators were
viewed as private attorneys general,454 enforcing the securities laws to
further the policy of protecting investors. Arguably, judicial over-
exuberance led to some loose reasoning in cases such as Superintendent
of Insurance and Affiliated Ute.
The expansion of Rule lOb-5 was slowed and more judicial disci-
pline was injected by the Burger Court in the mid-1970s. A trilogy of
well-reasoned conservative decisions put Rule 1Ob-5 jurisprudence in a
proper perspective: plaintiffs needed to be buyers or sellers to have
standing, scienter was required to distinguish the implied cause of action
452. Id. at 705-06.
453. Id. at 704 (internal quotation mark omitted).
454. See, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964) ("Private enforcement of the
proxy rules provides a necessary supplement to Commission action. As in anti-trust treble damage
litigation, the possibility of civil damages or injunctive relief serves as a most effective weapon in
the enforcement of the proxy requirements.").
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from the express remedies in the securities acts, and deception was the
touchstone for an action predicated upon a statute giving the SEC the
authority to prohibit only manipulative or deception conduct.
In the 1980s the Rehnquist Court began a naYve and reactionary
trend-ignoring fraudulent conduct in order to further circumscribe the
reach of Rule lOb-5. Although the securities laws were enacted because
the common law was inadequate, the Court in Chiarella introduced the
common law concept of fiduciary duty to curtail the application of the
securities laws, while citing authority that took a diametrically opposed
interpretation. This was the beginning of an outcome-determinative anal-
ysis that was expanded in Dirks to add a naYve quality when the Court
ignored the SEC's warning that some excuse could always be fabricat-
ed455 to evade the test for liability formulated by the Dirks majority.
The final trilogy began with the Rehnquist Court and ended with the
Roberts Court. Conservative jurisprudence has now been abandoned, and
the Court used one ill-reasoned decision to awkwardly justify an even
more ill-reasoned decision. Central Bank was the epitome of judicial
activism. The Court instructed the parties to brief an issue that had not
been considered in the courts below nor raised by the parties on appeal;
the Court rejected the unanimous position of all the judicial circuit courts
that aiding and abetting liability did attach to a primary violation under
Rule lOb-5; the Court ignored statutory language and legislative history
that dictated a contrary result; and the Court relied upon the lack of aid-
ing and abetting provisions with respect to express private causes of ac-
tion sounding in negligence to justify the elimination of aiding and abet-
ting liability under Rule 1Ob-5, which requires scienter-ignoring the
fact that aiding and abetting liability traditionally had not been applicable
with respect to negligence actions.
In the Stoneridge and Janus Capital cases, the Court then strained
to contort these cases as being controlled by Central Bank, even though
they involved direct participation in the fraud, rather than aiding and
abetting liability. It then articulated an absurd interpretation of the word
"make" in Janus Capital to exculpate the person who not only drafted
the document but also controlled the "facts" in the document that made it
misleading.
Since the 1980s, the fact is inescapable that the Supreme Court,
confronting activity that it acknowledged as fraudulent,456 has engaged in
455. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 663 (1983) ("The SEC argues that, if inside-trading
liability does not exist when the information is transmitted for a proper purpose but is used for trad-
ing, it would be a rare situation when the parties could not fabricate some ostensibly legitimate
business justification for transmitting the information. We think the SEC is unduly concerned.").
456. Arguably, this is not true of the defendant in Dirks: the majority saw him as a hero even
though he personally profited by enabling his clients to dump stock and depress the market, to the
detriment of uninformed public investors. Id. at 665-67.
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tortuous, outcome-determinative r asoning to create, in effect, safe har-
bors for fraudulent activity. In so doing, the Court reflects not a con-
servative philosophy, but a reactionary one. Its advocacy for conduct that
in some instances could be criminal stands in stark contrast o the Warren
Court. The Warren Court sought to protect the uninformed from the
power of the State; the Roberts Court appears to protect the powerful
from the uninformed investing public.
While correlation is not causation, it is noteworthy that a rash of in-
sider trading followed the insider trading trilogy, and that the corporate
corruption scandals457  of the 2000s followed Central Bank and
PSLRA.458 The impact of the insider trading cases has been dampened by
the enactment of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act and the Insider Trad-
ing Securities Fraud Enforcement Act,459 and the reluctant acceptance of
the misappropriation theory by the Supreme Court in O 'Hagan.46° On the
other hand, the Court's ill-advised emasculation of liability for collateral
participants needs to be reversed legislatively. Congress went part way
when it reinstated aiding and abetting liability in actions brought by the
SEC. It now needs to complete this effort by extending aiding and abet-
ting liability to private litigation. By reversing Central Bank, it will also
take down Stoneridge and Janus Capital, and close the judicially created
loopholes that have enabled corrupt actors to act with impunity and avoid
accountability.
457. See HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, SARBANES-)XLEY ACT IN PERSPECTIVE app. D at 869-
70 (2006-2007 ed. 2006) (listing over twenty of the more spectacular examples of corporate corrup-
tion during this period).
458. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1) (2012) (the effect of this provision is to exculpate a
person who, with knowledge, makes a fraudulent forward-looking statement, if the statement is
accompanied with cautionary language).
459. See supra text accompanying notes 295-96 (discussing the impact of these legislative
enactments).
460. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented from the Court's ac-
ceptance of the misappropriation theory. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 646, 650 (1997).
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EXHIBIT A
Insider Trading Models
Chiarelila Dirks
Company
Sperifi
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(Temporary Insiders)
Tender Offer
Insider Trading
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